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Studying Nonobviousness
JASON RANTANEN, LINDSAY KRIZ & ABIGAIL A. MATTHEWS†
Many scholars have observed that an empirical study is only valid to the extent it is reliable. Yet
assessments of the reliability of empirical legal studies are rare. The closest most scholarship
comes is to compare the results of their studies to those of others. As a result, in many legal fields,
including intellectual property law, scholars lack a grounded understanding of how valid or
reliable empirical legal studies really are.
This Article examines the reliability of empirical studies of judicial decisions by closely
comparing two recent studies of the patent law doctrine of nonobviousness. We find these studies
provide robust results despite differences in the cases selected to include in each dataset.
However, the amount of agreement varied for some data fields more than others. Particularly,
there was more inter-study variability for fields that examined judicial reasoning than fields for
decision outcomes. This finding provides some validation for the use of macro-level studies of
judicial decision-making. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis to directly
compare the actual coding (as opposed to just the outcomes) of two different studies examining
the same patent law doctrine.
Building on the existing data, we also make an original contribution to the literature on
nonobviousness by extending the time studied to the present. In contrast with studies examining
the immediate period after the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR v. Teleflex, we find (1) a
substantial decline in the number of 35 U.S.C. § 103 district court cases appealed to the Federal
Circuit, (2) a higher rate at which courts deem the patent nonobvious, and (3) a high affirmance
rate for district court determinations of both “obvious” and “nonobvious.”

† David L. Hammer and Willard L. “Sandy” Boyd Professor of Law and Director, Innovation, Business
& Law Center, University of Iowa College of Law. The research team for this project included Madison
Murhammer Colon, John Miscevich, Joseph Bauer, Daniel Kieffer, William O’Brien, Meddie Demmings, and
Ryan Meger. The authors also thank Judge Ryan Holte and Professor Ted Sichelman for making their data
available for this analysis, and Janet Freilich, Ryan Holte, Dmitry Karshtedt, Amy Semet, Ted Sichelman, and
Samantha Zyontz for comments on an earlier draft. Comments can be sent to jason-rantanen@uiowa.edu. Data
for this study is archived at Jason Rantanen, Lindsay Kriz & Abigail Matthews, Replication Data for “Studying
Nonobviousness”, HARVARD DATAVERSE V1 (2022), https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/A1UTYC. Lindsay Kriz,
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INTRODUCTION
A study is only as valuable as the data, methodology, and analysis that it
contains. While scholars and policymakers presume academic research—
particularly when it is based on empirical studies—is reliable, scholars have
done relatively little work to assess that assumption for legal studies. This is
especially significant given the lack of systematic peer assessment of most
empirical legal studies due to the nature of how journals publish legal
scholarship.1 With the increasing popularity of empirical studies in intellectual
property law,2 questions about the reliability of these studies are paramount.
Reliability is the extent to which results are consistent and an accurate
representation of the population.3 One concept at the heart of reliability is
replicability. Replicability is the ability of subsequent researchers to redo a study
or experiment and achieve the same results.4 And conversely, irreplicability
shows an experiment does not work, and “tells us something about the world
that is not true.”5 While other fields have experienced a “replicability crisis,” as
Janet Freilich explains in The Replicability Crisis in Patent Law, law has been
slow to follow.6 Indeed, published assessments of the replicability of empirical
legal studies—and reliability, more generally—are more elusive than the
empirical studies themselves.
The lack of published reliability assessments is as true in empirical
intellectual property law studies as in other areas of the law. For example,
1. It is well known that most legal scholarship is published in student-edited journals with relatively little
involvement by non-students. See, e.g., Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing the Law Review in the Age
of Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 615, 630–31 (1996); Howard A. Denemark, The Death of Law Reviews Has
Been Predicted: What Might Be Lost When the Last Law Review Shuts Down?, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 7
(1996). With the exception of the Northwestern Law Review’s annual empirical studies issue, and perhaps a few
others, pre-publication assessment of empirical legal studies is not conducted by scholars with familiarity with
empirical methods. A common response is that legal scholarship’s true peer assessment occurs after publication
as legal scholars, lawyers, judges, and policymakers read and engage with it. See, e.g., Richard A. Wise, Lucy
S. McGough, James W. Bowers, Douglas P. Peters, Joseph C. Miller, Heather K. Terrell, Brett Holfeld & Joe
H. Neal, Do Law Reviews Need Reform? A Survey of Law Professors, Student Editors, Attorneys, and Judges,
59 LOY. L. REV. 1, 30 (2013). While this may be a good point for argument-based legal scholarship, we think
that it has less weight when it comes to empirical legal studies, which often require substantial time, effort, and
expertise to assess their credibility and reliability.
2. There are so many studies in intellectual property law that a literature review of them comprises an
entire Research Handbook volume. See generally RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW: VOL. 2: ANALYTICAL METHODS (Peter S. Menell & David L. Schwartz eds., 2019).
3. Nahid Golafshani, Understanding Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research, 8 QUALITATIVE
REP. 597, 598 (2003).
4. Janet Freilich, The Replicability Crisis in Patent Law, 95 IND. L.J. 431, 438–40 (2020).
5. Id. at 440.
6. Id. at 433. There is an annual Empirical Legal Studies Replication Conference, but participation is
limited due to the fact that so few legal scholars undertake replication studies. A list of the 2019 participants can
be found at Empirical Legal Studies Replication Conference, 2019, SCIENCEDIRECT: INT’L REV. L. & ECON.,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/international-review-of-law-and-economics/special-issue/
10TQ91RK6PC (last visited Mar. 18, 2022). Another obstacle legal scholars face is the limited access to data,
since it is not the norm for legal scholars to publish datasets and therefore very few do so. Legal scholars wishing
to execute a replication study therefore can either request access to data used in a prior study or collect the data
themselves using the limited number of available sources.
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despite the many studies of nonobviousness—the “ultimate condition” for a
patent7—there has been relatively little work done to assess the reliability of
these studies. While articles typically discuss whether their results are consistent
or inconsistent with past studies,8 and there has been limited inter-study analysis
focused on comparing outcomes,9 no prior nonobviousness scholarship has
systematically compared two studies for the same time period and the same
selection criteria to assess study replicability. This is problematic because
studies rarely overlap in the time they encompass, rendering comparisons of
limited value for assessing reliability.10 Nor has anyone directly compared the
coding for these studies to determine the reliability of particular types of data
and its variables. More broadly, to the best of our knowledge, there are no datalevel comparisons for any of the studies of intellectual property law doctrines.11
To gain insight into the reliability question, this article compares two
different research groups’ datasets of patent law’s nonobviousness requirement:
(1) Ryan Holte and Ted Sichelman’s Cycles of Obviousness (“Holte &
Sichelman (2019)”)12 and (2) Jason Rantanen’s The Federal Circuit’s New
Obviousness Jurisprudence (“Rantanen (2013)”).13 We selected these two
studies because they are the most comprehensive studies of the Federal Circuit’s

7. See generally NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F.
Witherspoon ed., 1980) (collecting Judge Rich’s essays on the topic).
8. See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study,
16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709 (2013) [hereinafter Rantanen, Obviousness Jurisprudence]; Ryan T. Holte & Ted
Sichelman, Cycles of Obviousness, 105 IOWA L. REV. 107 (2019); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. & Christian T. Johnson,
Not So Obvious after All: Patent Law’s Nonobviousness Requirement, KSR, and the Fear of Hindsight Bias,
47 GA. L. REV. 41 (2012); Brendan Seth O’Brien O’Shea, Note, What Is Obvious: Empirical Assessment of
KSR’s Impact, 45 AIPLA Q.J. 517 (2017); Gregory N. Mandel, A Nonobvious Comparison: Nonobviousness
Decisions at the PTAB and in the Federal Courts, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 403 (2016).
9. Jason Rantanen, Empirical Analyses of Judicial Opinions: Methodology, Metrics, and the Federal
Circuit, 49 CONN. L. REV. 227, 242–59 (2016) [hereinafter Rantanen, Judicial Opinions].
10. Accurate measurement includes three different but related concepts. Reliability examines the
consistency, whether we get the same answer looking at different samples from the same population.
Replicability also refers to consistency, but to the exact same sample. It is the notion that if a different set of
individuals repeat a specific study, they should reach the same result. And validity is the extent to which we are
measuring what we say we are measuring. In this article, we focus on reliability generally, and inter-rater
reliability, specifically. Inter-rater reliability is the extent to which different individuals are consistent in their
judgments. See generally PAUL C. PRICE, RAJIV S. JHANGIANI, I-CHANT A. CHIANG, DANA C. LEIGHTON &
CARRIE CUTTLER, RESEARCH METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY (3d ed., 2017); ANOL BHATTACHERJEE, SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH: PRINCIPLES, METHODS, AND PRACTICES (2d ed., 2012).
11. In contrast, there are a few data-level reliability assessments in patent law outside of studies of judicial
opinions. See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette & Andrew Tutt, How Do Patent Incentives Affect University
Researchers?, 61 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. art. 105883 (2020); David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the
Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425 (2014); Germán Poo-Caamaño
& Daniel M. German, Software Patents: A Replication Study, PROC. OF THE 11TH INT’L SYMP. ON OPEN
COLLABORATION (2015).
12. Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8.
13. Rantanen, Obviousness Jurisprudence, supra note 8. Note that one of the authors of this paper is the
author of Rantanen, Obviousness Jurisprudence.
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jurisprudence before and after the Supreme Court’s opinion in KSR v. Teleflex,14
collectively encompassing the period from 1997 to 2013. Indeed, both
confidently assert they collected the entire population of district courts’
nonobviousness decisions.15 While there are other excellent studies of
nonobviousness, those either cover relatively short time periods or have only
limited overlap with other studies.16 Both Holte & Sichelman (2019) and
Rantanen (2013) examined changes in Federal Circuit decisions involving
nonobviousness before and after KSR, the first Supreme Court opinion
addressing obviousness in the Federal Circuit era.17 The central goal of these
studies was to test whether KSR produced a change in this core element of patent
law.18
We draw on two approaches rooted in the concept of replicability to assess
the reliability of this type of study. First, we compare the results of the two
studies while controlling for major methodological differences by limiting the
comparison to decisions from the same time period that contained an actual
determination of obviousness based on the studies’ methodologies. In addition,
we examine the record-level agreement between the studies’ coding of
individual decisions. This approach draws on an element of high-quality studies
involving human coding: inter-rater agreement assessments, which are used to
show the degree to which individual coders agree on an outcome.19 Rather than
simply apply this tool within our own study, however, we instead leverage it to
measure the amount of agreement between the final datasets for these two
studies.
Our reliability assessment reveals a complex picture. Somewhat
reassuringly, the results from the two studies are largely consistent for decisions
from the same time period. Surprisingly, however, fewer than two-thirds of the
decisions analyzed in both studies were the same—even when limited to the
14. The Court held that rigid and formal application of the teaching-suggestion-motivation test (“TSM”
test) is contrary to existing patent law precedent, and courts should instead take a wholistic and functional
approach to the obviousness inquiry by considering a variety of factors—including TSM—that are indicative of
obviousness. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418–19 (2007).
15. See Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 136 (“[W]e are fairly confident that we identified and collected
all district court and Federal Circuit obviousness decisions—including so-called Rule 36 summary affirmances
with no opinion—issued between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2013.”); Rantanen, Obviousness
Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 730 (“As a starting point, the coded cases represent essentially the entire universe
of opinions during the time period.”).
16. See studies cited infra note 26.
17. See generally KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. 398. Other studies examining the before/after of KSR include
Lunney & Johnson, supra note 8; Jennifer Nock & Sreekar Gadde, Raising the Bar for Nonobviousness: An
Empirical Study of Federal Circuit Case Law Following KSR, 20 FED. CIR. BAR J. 369 (2010); and Ali Mojibi,
An Empirical Study of the Effect of KSR v. Teleflex on the Federal Circuit’s Patent Validity Jurisprudence,
20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 101 (2010).
18. We note that Holte & Sichelman (2019) indicate that their data collection was part of a larger project
to examine obviousness-related changes and the 2019 article reports on only a portion of their dataset. See Holte
& Sichelman, supra note 8, at 138.
19. See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L.
REV. 63, 112–16 (2008) (describing the use of inter-rater agreement measures in empirical legal studies).
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identical time period and using the same criteria. Within that set of cases,
however, the core data coding was generally identical, with a few notable
exceptions. Specifically, we find differences in the coding for procedural
postures and in some coding related to judicial reasoning.
This comparison has significant implications for understanding the
reliability of patent law studies specifically and doctrinal assessments of judicial
decisions more generally. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis
to directly compare the coding from two separate research groups studying
judicial decisions involving patent law doctrines that used the same criteria to
record data about the cases. Our findings suggest that these types of studies are
reasonably replicable and can have robust results—although contextualized
interpretation of their results remains critical.20 Along those lines, we suggest
that while the results reported in articles can be important, scholars should not
overlook details on methodology, coding instruction, and the replicability of the
data.
***
Because they focused specifically on the effects of KSR, the datasets for
Rantanen (2013) and Holte & Sichelman (2019) stop a few years after that
decision. In Part II, we21 extend the empirical data on obviousness to December
2019. Using this more recent data, we find that:
•

The inter-rater reliability analysis indicated at least “substantial
agreement” for all recorded variables.

•

The number of Federal Circuit decisions in appeals arising from
the district courts that involved a 35 U.S.C. § 103 issue peaked
between 2010 and 2015, and in recent years has declined to half
of that peak.

•

The percentage of Federal Circuit decisions with an outcome of
“obvious” in appeals arising from the district courts remained high
between 2006 and 2014, but since 2015 the number of “obvious”
outcomes has fallen dramatically.

•

The Federal Circuit continues to affirm district courts on the issue
of obviousness at a high rate (around 80% of the time since 2013),
and—in contrast with the immediate post-KSR period studied by

20. In particular, as has been discussed in the literature, even when care is taken to identify the entire
population of decisions, selective forces resulting in population biases can affect the composition of appellate
decisions. See, e.g., Rantanen, Judicial Opinions, supra note 9, at 243–44 (discussing population biases in
appellate decisions).
21. Rantanen, Kriz, and Matthews.
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Holte & Sichelman (2019) and Rantanen (2013)—since 2013,
affirmances have been equally high for district court outcomes of
“nonobvious.”
•

The number of grants of summary judgment involving § 103 that
were reviewed by the Federal Circuit in its decisions has fallen
substantially in recent years. Nearly all § 103 decisions arising
from the district court that were reviewed by the Federal Circuit
between 2016 and 2019 involved a bench or jury trial.

The results from the data we collected for this new period are striking and
stand in sharp contrast with the period immediately after KSR. They show a
decline in appeals from district court decisions involving § 103 and a Federal
Circuit that is more deferential to the determinations that are appealed. They also
suggest that there has been a shift in the composition of the nonobviousness
issues arriving at the Federal Circuit or a Federal Circuit that is normatively
more skeptical of obviousness challenges to issued patents. There are reasons to
think there is some truth to both.
Finally, in order to maximize data transparency, the data that we used, the
codebook, and the Stata code for constructing and analyzing the data are being
published contemporaneously with this article.22
I. RELIABILITY
A. BACKGROUND
Patent law’s nonobviousness requirement has long fascinated scholars,
judges, and attorneys alike. This requirement, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103,
prohibits patents on claimed inventions “if the differences between the claimed
invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would
have been obvious” as of the patent application’s effective filing date.23 Many
people have offered doctrinal and theoretical perspectives on the requirement,
from Judge Giles Rich’s commentaries24 to Dmitry Karshtedt’s recent
Nonobviousness—Before and After.25 Scholars have closely examined the
nonobviousness requirement using quantitative techniques, with studies

22. Jason Rantanen, Lindsay Kriz & Abigail Matthews, Replication Data for “Studying Nonobviousness,”
HARVARD DATAVERSE, V1 (2022), https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/A1UTYC.
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018). While § 103 was amended in 2011, those amendments were relatively
minor. See JOHN F. DUFFY & ROBERT MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 511 (2017).
24. See NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 7 (collecting Judge Rich’s essays on the topic); see also Michael
Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1605 (2011);
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 891–92 (2004).
25. See Dmitry Karshtedt, Nonobviousness: Before and After, 106 IOWA L. REV. 1609 (2021).
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focusing on frequency, outcomes, and doctrine,26 or using it as a proxy to assess
judicial decisionmaking more broadly.27 These studies illustrate both the interest
in empirical examinations of the doctrine and the need to understand how
reliable this data is.28 After all, anyone can create some numbers; the real
question is whether they are worth anything.
While there are many empirical studies of nonobviousness, we focus on
The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence (“Rantanen (2013)”)29
and Cycles of Obviousness (“Holte & Sichelman (2019)”)30 for the reasons
discussed in the Introduction. Both studies examined written opinions and Rule
36 summary affirmances involving nonobviousness during the first decade of
the twenty-first century.31
Rantanen (2013) studied whether the Federal Circuit changed its approach
to nonobviousness after KSR with respect to both the analysis of the issue and
outcome of the case.32 The study period ranged from ten years before the grant
of certiorari in KSR (June 26, 2006) to five years after the Court’s decision (April
30, 2007).33 It found that following KSR, the Federal Circuit reached a
conclusion that patents34 were obvious more often than it did before KSR in
26. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363 (2001)
[Lunney, E-Obviousness]; Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical
Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 (2007); Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The
Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051
(2007); O’Brien O’Shea, supra note 8; Calvin M. Brien, An Empirical Analysis of Patent Validity in Inter Partes
Reviews through the Lens of KSR, 46 AIPLA Q.J. 413 (2018); Nock & Gadde, supra note 17; Michelle Friedman
Murray, Nonobviousness Standards for Hardware and Software Before and After KSR: What Is the Difference,
93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 259 (2011); Mandel, supra note 8. For additional doctrinal studies of
nonobviousness, see 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note
2, at 281–309.
27. See generally Banks Miller & Brett Curry, Expertise, Experience, and Ideology on Specialized Courts:
The Case of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 839 (2009); Banks Miller &
Brett Curry, Experts Judging Experts: The Role of Expertise in Reviewing Agency Decision Making, 38
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 55 (2013).
28. A few studies have also used experimental human techniques in human studies research to examine
obviousness. Lunney & Johnson, supra note 8; Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical
Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO STATE L.J. 1391 (2006).
29. Rantanen, Obviousness Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 732.
30. Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8.
31. Rule 36 summary affirmances allow the Federal Circuit to affirm the district court ruling without an
opinion. Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 231, 234 (2005). Thus, the Federal Circuit is able to efficiently rule on cases where the
determination under review was correct and there are no new legal issues to explain or discuss. Id.
32. Rantanen, Obviousness Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 732. In addition to examining appeals arising
from the district courts and International Trade Commission, Rantanen (2013) also examined appeals arising
from the USPTO. This data was reported separately from appeals arising from the district courts and ITC, and
is not discussed in this article. Note that there are many limitations of these types of macro-level studies of
judicial decisions, not the least of which are selection effects and the consequences of procedural postures. For
an in-depth discussion of these issues, see id. and Rantanen, Judicial Opinions, supra note 9.
33. In other words, from June 26, 1996 to April 30, 2012.
34. To be more accurate, the issue is whether patent claims are nonobvious. For ease of reading, however,
we use the colloquial “patents.”
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appeals arising from the district courts and International Trade Commission
(“ITC”).35 Before the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in KSR, the Federal
Circuit held patents to be obvious 46% of the time, while after KSR it reached a
conclusion that the patents were obvious 57% of the time.36 Success for patent
challengers was in part attributed to the fact that the Federal Circuit affirmed
lower court findings of obviousness at a greater rate post-KSR.37 Before KSR,
the Federal Circuit affirmed 60% of district court determinations that the patents
were obvious, while after KSR it affirmed 81% of those decisions.38 One
explanation offered by the study was that the Federal Circuit was being more
deferential to district courts following KSR; another was that the Federal
Circuit’s jurisprudence itself reflected a raised bar for patents to be
nonobvious.39
Recently, former professor (now judge) Ryan Holte and Professor Ted
Sichelman undertook another study of nonobviousness decisions during the
period around KSR. In contrast with the Rantanen (2013) study, which focused
entirely on the Federal Circuit, Holte and Sichelman studied both appellate
decisions and district court decisions, providing a deeper picture of § 10340
decisions in patent infringement litigation.41 Their study analyzed Federal
Circuit and district court cases between January 1, 2003 and December 31,
2013,42 and found that prior to KSR, the Federal Circuit held patents obvious
49% of the time, while after KSR the Federal Circuit found patents obvious 57%
of the time.43 As in Rantanen (2013), Holte & Sichelman (2019) examined
affirmance rates, finding that prior to KSR, the Federal Circuit affirmed
obviousness outcomes 81% of the time, while after KSR it affirmed them 90%
of the time.44 Nonobviousness dispositions reflected the opposite pattern, with
the Federal Circuit affirming district court determinations of nonobviousness
85% of the time prior to KSR but 68% of the time following KSR.45
Both studies mostly used the same data coding instructions.46 They
typically contain coding instructions in “codebooks,” which are designed to

35. Rantanen, Obviousness Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 736. In hindsight, the data in Rantanen (2013)
would have been more clearly reported if it had not included appeals from the ITC with appeals from the district
courts—especially given that there were very few decisions arising from the ITC (only 6), so they do not really
add anything to the study.
36. Id. at 737.
37. Id. at 741.
38. Id. at 744.
39. Id. at 746–47.
40. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018).
41. See generally Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8.
42. Id. at 145.
43. Id. at 142. The authors reported a “mixed” outcome rate of 4% prior to KSR and 7% after KSR. Id.
44. Id. at 146.
45. Id.
46. Indeed, portions of the Holte & Sichelman (2019) codebook were verbatim of the Rantanen (2013)
codebook—which, to be clear, is a good thing for assessing replicability! See Rantanen, Judicial Opinions, supra
note 9, at 281–82.
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serve as a guide while collecting and reporting the data.47 These guides “should
be sufficiently rich so that [they] not only enable[] the researchers to code their
data reliably but also allows others to replicate, reproduce, update, or build on
the variables housed in the database . . .”48 As a preliminary matter, Holte and
Sichelman indicate they relied heavily on the techniques described in Rantanen
(2013) to identify all obviousness decisions during their period of analysis.49
Thus, both studies collected relevant opinions by first executing at least a broad
Westlaw search, then manually refined the search results to eliminate any
opinion that did not actually contain an obviousness determination.50 Beyond
that, comparing the codebooks51 shows that nearly all of the coding instructions
for Federal Circuit decisions mirror one another.52
With the addition of the district court data, Holte and Sichelman were also
able to directly examine the outcomes at the district courts. They found that,
whereas prior to KSR 69% of outcomes at the district courts were that the patents
were nonobvious, after KSR 48% of outcomes were that the patents were
nonobvious.53 However, the appeals actually decided by the Federal Circuit
indicated about an even split of district court findings of obvious and
nonobvious.54 From this Holte and Sichelman reached the conclusion that “a
much higher absolute percentage of litigants began to appeal nonobviousness
findings post-KSR.”55 This adds support to the idea that not only were there
fewer nonobviousness outcomes at the district courts but those (fewer)
nonobvious outcomes were being appealed more often—thus suggesting a shift
in the underlying spectrum of cases being reviewed by the Federal Circuit.56

47. LEE EPSTEIN & ANDREW D. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 106, 112
(2014).
48. Id. at 106.
49. Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 136 n.219.
50. Rantanen (2013) used a variety of searches on Westlaw to identify cases. Rantanen, Obviousness
Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 727. In contrast, Holte & Sichelman (2019) first identified cases by relying upon
PatStats and Docket Navigator, then used a Westlaw search to supplement those sources. Holte & Sichelman,
supra note 8, at 136 n.221. In addition, Holte & Sichelman (2019) drew upon their identification of district court
decisions in locating appellate decisions. Id. The more expansive search techniques used by Holte & Sichelman
(2019) may explain some of the differences in the resulting data sets discussed below.
51. See JASON RANTANEN, CODEBOOK FOR EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT OBVIOUSNESS
JURISPRUDENCE (2013), https://empirical.law.uiowa.edu/sites/empirical.law.uiowa.edu/files/wysiwyg_uploads/
Obviousness%20Codebook%20Final%202013-07-05.pdf [hereinafter RANTANEN CODEBOOK]; TED
SICHELMAN & RYAN HOLTE, CODEBOOKS FOR CYCLES OF OBVIOUSNESS (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3719135 [hereinafter HOLTE & SICHELMAN CODEBOOK].
52. See RANTANEN CODEBOOK, supra note 51; HOLTE & SICHELMAN CODEBOOK, supra note 51.
53. Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 141 fig.1.
54. The Rantanen (2013) study referred to this as the “substrate” of Federal Circuit decisions and also
reported about an even split of obvious and nonobvious decisions by the lower tribunal. See Rantanen,
Obviousness Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 740.
55. Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 145.
56. See Rantanen, Obviousness Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 746–47.
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B. RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
This study assesses the reliability of empirical studies of judicial decisions
by comparing the results and data of Rantanen (2013) and Holte & Sichelman
(2019). To do so, we first compare the results of the two studies within identical
time periods and with similar record selection criteria. Next, we draw on
methodologies traditionally used to assess inter-rater agreement within studies
and apply those techniques to assess the agreement between the coding of the
individual records that are included in both studies.
One point we want to stress at the outset: this approach is only possible
because data and methodological information was available for both studies.57
The data and Codebook for Rantanen (2013) are publicly available on the
internet.58 The Holte & Sichelman (2019) Codebook is also available on the
internet and the authors provided us with a copy of their data.59 Without access
to their data and codebook, our best alternative would be to compare the overall
numbers from their article. This would have provided limited ability to conduct
a reliability assessment, given that the time periods reported in the two studies
overlap only in part. Lack of available data can pose a substantial barrier to
conducting reliability assessments.60 Fortunately, that was not the case here.
C. COMPARISON OF STUDY RESULTS
The temporal overlap, coding of identical fields, and use of essentially the
same coding criteria for the Rantanen (2013) and Holte & Sichelman (2019)
studies provide an opportunity for something that has conventionally been quite
rare in the literature of empirical studies of patent law decisions: the ability to
directly compare the results of two studies of the same subject during the same
time period conducted by different research groups.61 In addition, advancements
in data collection and management capabilities, along with interdisciplinary
expertise, allow for direct comparison at the individual record level. These
comparisons provide a better understanding of the reliability of this type of
research.
1. Methodology for Comparison of Results
A major barrier to assessing reliability by comparing results is that casebased studies frequently differ in their record selection criteria. This is true here.
57. Cf. Todd E. Pettys, Free Expression, In-Group Bias, and the Court’s Conservatives: A Critique of the
Epstein-Parker-Segal Study, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2015) (replicating a portion of the Epstein, Parker, and Segal
study and identifying coding issues in the Epstein, Parker, and Segal methodologies).
58. The data and codebook are available at Studies and Data, FED. CIR. DATA PROJECT,
https://empirical.law.uiowa.edu/studies-and-data (last visited Mar. 18, 2022).
59. See Holte & Sichelman Codebook, supra note 51.
60. See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, The Future of Empirical Legal Studies: A Response to Holte & Sichelman’s
Cycles of Obviousness, 105 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 15 (2020) [hereinafter Rantanen, Response to Holte &
Sichelman]; Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 11.
61. See generally Rantanen, Judicial Opinions, supra note 9.
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With respect to differences in time period, while Rantanen (2013) contained
decisions for about a six-year period before the starting point of the period in
Holte & Sichelman (2019), Holte & Sichelman (2019) contained decisions for
about a year and a half after Rantanen (2013). Rantanen (2013) also
distinguished between Federal Circuit decisions before the date of certiorari and
after the Court’s decision, whereas Holte & Sichelman (2019) used the date of
the Court’s decision as the breakpoint.62 In addition, Rantanen (2013) included
decisions arising from the ITC and decisions in which the Federal Circuit did
not reach a final conclusion on obviousness; Holte & Sichelman (2019) did
not.63 As a result, even though the results of both studies are consistent, and
support the overall conclusion that the Federal Circuit’s nonobviousness
jurisprudence appears to have changed after KSR, the statistics reported in the
two papers cannot just be pasted next to one another.
In order to directly compare the two studies, we began with their complete
datasets of Federal Circuit decisions and created subsets that met the comparison
criteria.64 We limited both datasets to Federal Circuit decisions that arose from
the district courts and that were decided between January 1, 2003 and April 30,
2012 (the overlapping time period). Because they were not addressed in
Rantanen (2013) or Holte and Sichelman (2019), we excluded interference
proceedings and appeals involving a preliminary injunction.65 In addition, the
unit of analysis was a Federal Circuit decision.66 Because Holte and Sichelman
(2019) only counted decisions in which there was an “actual obviousness
determination,”67 we excluded from the Rantanen (2013) dataset decisions that

62. See Rantanen, Obviousness Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 726–27; Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8,
at 140; see also Holte & Sichelman Codebook, supra note 51.
63. See Rantanen, Obviousness Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 737–38; see also Rantanen, Judicial
Opinions, supra note 9; Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 161. An example of this would be a Federal Circuit
decision vacating summary judgment of obviousness and remanding to the district court.
64. The complete Stata code for the construction of the comparison dataset and the analyses contained in
this article will be made publicly available at empirical.law.uiowa.edu and archived on the Harvard Dataverse.
Rantanen, et al., Replication Data, supra note 22.
65. The reason for treating these decisions separately is discussed in Rantanen, Obviousness Jurisprudence,
supra note 8, at 727 n.89. One decision was coded as a preliminary injunction in one dataset and a bench trial in
another; we kept that decision in the dataset.
66. See generally Rantanen, Judicial Opinions, supra note 9 (discussing the different levels at which
judicial analyses in patent opinions can be analyzed). Differences in the unit of analysis for nonobviousness
would only have a de minimis effect due to the rarity of inconsistent outcomes in these analyses. See generally
id. In order to compare decisions at the decision-level, decisions with multiple analyses that were coded
differently from the Rantanen (2013) dataset were labeled “Mixed.” As the data in this article show, these were
rare. “Mixed” decisions are discussed in the footnotes in Part I.A. and in the text in Part I.B.
67. See Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 136. For example, Holte & Sichelman (2019) did not include
decisions to vacate in their data set. See id. at 146 n.251.
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had been coded as “2-No Final Determination.”68 This resulted in 179 decisions
from Rantanen (2013) and 153 decisions from Holte and Sichelman (2019).69
The remainder of this section reports descriptive statistics comparing the
results for the two subsets from Rantanen (2013) and Holte and Sichelman
(2019) meeting the criteria described above. We focus on those elements of the
studies that are most comparable, recognizing that there are other facets of each
study that go beyond what we can directly compare.
2. Numbers of Pre- and Post-decision Records in Each Dataset
As shown in the table below, while the two datasets contained almost the
same number of decisions for the pre-decision time period, the set from
Rantanen (2013) contained 115 decisions for the period between April 30, 2007
and April 30, 2012 while Holte and Sichelman (2019) contained 89.
TABLE 1: RECORDS IN DATASETS

Rantanen (2013)
Holte & Sichelman
(2019)

Pre-certiorari
Records in Dataset

Records Between
Certiorari &
Decision

Post-decision
Records in Dataset

44

20

115

47

17

89

This difference is surprising: while both studies used the same general
decision selection criteria, there were substantially more decisions included in
Rantanen (2013) for the post-decision time period.
3. Procedural Postures of Decisions in Each Dataset
To examine possible reasons for the difference in cases—and to see
whether there were differences in other results between the studies—we next
compared the results for the procedural posture of the appeal, the § 103
determination at the district court level, the outcome on § 103 at the appellate
level, and whether the appellate court affirmed or reversed the district court.
Typically, an appeal involving obviousness arising from patent infringement
litigation in the district court will result from a grant of summary judgment, a

68. See id. at 146 n.252. This resulted in the exclusion of 33 decisions from Rantanen (2013).
69. We debated whether to keep decisions that met the “type” criteria in one study but not the other.
Ultimately, we decided to not include a decision in a particular dataset if it did not meet the criteria, even if it
met the criteria in the other dataset. This meant that a small number of decisions that were in both datasets were
treated as if they were in just one dataset. The consequence of this was to remove four decisions from the
Rantanen (2013) dataset that were present in Holte & Sichelman (2019) and four decisions from the Holte &
Sichelman (2019) dataset that were present in Rantanen (2013). Additional details are available in the Stata code
file “2021-02-05 Construction of Comparison Dataset.do.”
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bench trial, or a jury verdict.70 Generally, jury verdicts are appealed in a grant or
denial of a renewed motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (“JMOL”).71
As the below table shows, while the number of records in each dataset
involving an appeal from a grant of summary judgment and bench trials was
about the same, Rantanen (2013) contained many more decisions coded as
appeals arising from jury verdicts while Holte and Sichelman (2019) contained
more decisions coded as arising from JMOLs. The difference for jury verdicts
appears especially sharp in the post-KSR time period: Rantanen (2013) had
forty-six records coded as arising from jury verdicts in the post-KSR time period
(40% of the decisions for that period) while Holte and Sichelman (2019) had
twenty-one (23% of the decisions for that time period). We explore likely
explanations for this difference in more depth below in Part I.G.
TABLE 2: PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF DISTRICT COURT DETERMINATIONS
REVIEWED BY FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Rantanen (2013)
Jury
Bench
JMOL
Summary Judgment

70
47
11
51

Holte & Sichelman
(2019)72
37
44
26
43

Setting aside the differences in how researchers coded Jury versus JMOL,
however, the procedural posture results are relatively close: 45% of Rantanen
(2013) involved an appeal from a jury decision (either coded as Jury or JMOL)
versus 42% of Holte and Sichelman (2019); 26% versus 30%, respectively,
involved an appeal from a bench trial, and in both datasets 28% involved an
appeal from a grant of summary judgment. This is also true for the post-KSR
period: if one adds jury determinations to JMOLs post-KSR, this results in fifty2 decisions (45%) in Rantanen (2013) and 34 decisions (37%) in Holte and
Sichelman (2019)—still a notable difference, but not as large as the difference
when examining the Jury versus JMOL data individually.

70. See Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 147.
71. 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 5.07 (4th ed.,
2019).
72. Holte & Sichelman (2019) also had three decisions with multiple procedural postures; we refer to these
as “Multiple Postures.”
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4. Obviousness Outcomes of Decisions in Each Dataset
Both Holte and Sichelman (2019) and Rantanen (2013) report data on the
district court determinations reviewed by the Federal Circuit.73 Rantanen (2013)
refers to these as the “substrate” of the appeal: the determinations on
obviousness at the district court that are actually being reviewed by the appellate
court.74 The below table compares the rates at which each study reported that the
determination being reviewed by the Federal Circuit had reached a conclusion
of “obvious.”
TABLE 3: DISTRICT COURT DETERMINATIONS REVIEWED
BY THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Pre-decision in KSR

Post-decision in KSR

Rantanen (2013)

46% (29/63)

47% (54/114)

Holte & Sichelman (2019)76

48% (29/60)

55% (48/86)

75

Overall, this table shows consistent results for both studies for the pre-KSR
period but modestly different results for the post-KSR period. We discuss
potential explanations for this difference in more detail below in Part I.D.
Outcomes at the appellate level reflect a similar pattern. As shown in Table
4, the descriptive statistical comparison for the pre-decision period (January 1,
2003, to April 30, 2011) is very similar for the obviousness outcomes. However,
for the post-KSR period, the number of “nonobvious” outcomes reported by
Rantanen (2013) was higher. The consequence of this difference is that the Holte
and Sichelman (2019) dataset indicates a higher rate of obviousness than the
Rantanen (2013) dataset. However, both datasets provide evidence of a shift in
§ 103 outcomes at the Federal Circuit in appeals arising from the district courts
between the pre- and post-KSR periods.77

73. Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 146; Rantanen, Obviousness Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 740–
44.
74. Rantanen, Obviousness Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 740.
75. One decision in Rantanen (2013) did not have the determination under review coded and two decisions
had “Both” outcomes; these are not included in the tables or percentages.
76. In addition, there were seven decisions in Holte & Sichelman (2019) with “Both” outcomes as the
determination being reviewed. These are not included in the table or percentages.
77. As shown in Rantanen, Obviousness Jurisprudence, supra note 8 and Mojibi, supra note 17, the
difference is even greater when the period between grant of certiorari and the Court’s announcement of its
decision is excluded. Excluding this period from the obviousness analysis makes sense because the Court may
have been signaling that the Federal Circuit’s obviousness standard was too low. See Mojibi supra note 17, at
585. In fact, running the analysis for the portion of the comparison period (starting January 1, 2003) prior to
certiorari results in an “obvious” outcome of just 42% (Rantanen (2013) data) and 41% (Holte & Sichelman
(2019) data).
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TABLE 4: FEDERAL CIRCUIT DETERMINATIONS OF “OBVIOUS”
Rantanen (2013)78
Holte & Sichelman (2019)

Pre-decision in KSR

Post-decision in KSR

50% Obvious (31/62)
52% Obvious (33/64)

57% Obvious (63/110)
66% Obvious (59/89)

5. Appellate Dispositions in Each Dataset
As shown in Table 5, the overall affirmance rates were about the same for
both before and after KSR, and were approximately the same between the two
studies. Because Holte and Sichelman (2019) did not include decisions to vacate,
it was not possible to compare those outcomes.79
TABLE 5: FEDERAL CIRCUIT DISPOSITIONS WHEN MAKING FINAL
DETERMINATIONS ON OBVIOUSNESS

Rantanen (2013)80
Holte & Sichelman (2019)81

Pre-decision in KSR
87% Affirmance (55/63)
86% Affirmance (54/63)

Post-decision in KSR
86% Affirmance (95/110)
79% Affirmance (70/89)

The results between the two studies were generally consistent, except for
the coding for Jury versus JMOL and Holte and Sichelman (2019)’s modestly
higher comparative obviousness rates for the five years after KSR. This is good!
It suggests that two different research groups that were trying to study the same
phenomenon saw basically the same thing. The results from both datasets
consistently show that about half of the district court determinations that the
Federal Circuit reviewed arose from a jury verdict (either in a grant or denial of
a JMOL), a higher obviousness rate at the Federal Circuit during the five years
following KSR, and a very high affirmance rate for district court determinations
involving § 103. And yet, there was still a substantial difference between the two
datasets, both in terms of the number of cases studied and the reported values
for some metrics.

78. In addition, there were seven “Both” outcomes at the Federal Circuit (2 pre-KSR decision and 5 postKSR decision) in the Rantanen (2013) dataset. These are not included in the table or percentages.
79. For a discussion of why decisions to vacate can matter, see Rantanen, Judicial Opinions, supra note 9,
at 263–65.
80. In addition, Rantanen (2013) had five “Mixed Dispositions” and one decision that did not have
disposition coded. These are not included in the table or percentages.
81. In addition, Holte & Sichelman (2019) had one “Mixed Disposition.” This is not included in the table
or percentages.
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D. DATASET COMPARISON
Looking at summary statistics only provides a general comparison of the
two datasets, however. A more thorough analysis requires comparing the actual
records within the two datasets. In particular, the difference in the number of
cases studied, the obviousness rates for the post-KSR period, and the difference
in the number of decisions in the two datasets, suggests the need for additional
analysis.
Direct comparison analysis reveals much greater differences in the
composition of the two datasets than the above summary statistics suggest.
Fewer than two thirds of the cases were the same across the two studies.
However, for the decisions that matched (i.e., were contained in both datasets),
the coding was highly consistent—except for the Jury/JMOL coding described
above and some of the coding relating to judicial reasoning.
1. Methodology For Direct Record Comparison
Historically, direct record comparison in empirical studies of patent law
decisions has not been a simple task. To the best of our knowledge, this Article
is the first to report this type of analysis. The ability to compare studies at the
record level has been frustrated by a lack of publication of (or even access to)
study data, different mechanisms for identifying and recording individual
decisions, and the lack of a universal identifier to allow records to be matched
across studies.82 This has restricted the ability to use automated matching and
merge techniques. Comparing data for large datasets is especially challenging
because of the number of individual determinations and matches that must be
made.
Consequently, the first task for the direct record comparison was to identify
all matches between records in Holte and Sichelman (2019) and Rantanen
(2013).83 We initially matched using an algorithmic analysis—essentially using
automated text comparison techniques to find as many matches as possible
between citations and case names—followed by human review. The end goal
was to find every match between the two datasets through an iterative process.
The final dataset contains all records from the Rantanen (2013) and Holte and
Sichelman (2019) sets generated in Part I, along with the corresponding data
from the other dataset, if a match was made.84
To evaluate how much agreement there is between the Rantanen (2013)
and Holte and Sichelman (2019) data, we analyze the inter-rater reliability
82. See Rantanen, Judicial Opinions, supra note 9, at 12. Different studies use different case name
conventions, and while official Reporter citations can be used for published, precedential opinions, variations in
how this data is recorded pose challenges for automated matching. In addition, some datasets do not include
official reporter citations for some or all decisions. Furthermore, some decisions—particularly Rule 36 summary
affirmances—may share the same reporter citation.
83. We also matched the records to the Compendium of Federal Circuit Decisions to allow for improved
future analysis of the data.
84. The final matched dataset is available at Studies and Data, supra note 58.
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between the two studies. Inter-rater reliability refers to the level of agreement
between two or more raters. Our goal is to quantify the level of agreement
between Holte and Sichelman (2019) and Rantanen (2013). While percentages
can provide some information about agreement, relying on percentages alone is
insufficient because there may be instances in which two individuals agree
purely by chance.
For all the inter-rater reliability measures we calculate below, we make a
few key assumptions. First, we treat Holte and Sichelman as one “coder” and
Rantanen as the second coder. In other words, rather than treating an individual
human as the rater, we treat the study’s final dataset—the coding that Holte and
Sichelman agreed on—as the coder. This makes sense because our goal is to
assess the amount of agreement between these two studies. The remaining
assumptions are necessary to calculate the inter-rater agreement statistics. For
our second assumption, we assume the two raters coded the data independently,
i.e., Holte and Sichelman’s coding did not affect Rantanen’s rating and vice
versa.85 We also assume there were no additional coders and only Holte and
Sichelman and Rantanen made the final determination on all the observations.
Our final assumption is that each variable had the same number of categories.
For example, when coding the appellate court’s disposition of the case, there
were only two categories: obvious or nonobvious.
To assess inter-rater reliability, we calculate kappa statistics.86 Kappa (𝜅)
ranges from –1 to +1, with –1 meaning less agreement than chance and +1
representing complete agreement.87 A score of zero indicates the coding was
reached by pure chance. Since we have a fixed number of raters (two) and all
nominal data, we primarily rely on Cohen’s kappa statistic.88
We do not expect to discover perfect reliability. We interpret kappa using
Landis and Koch’s89 benchmark scale calculated using Gwet’s probabilistic-

85. While Rantanen did provide his dataset to Holte and Sichelman early in their project, Holte and
Sichelman confirmed that their fields were coded independently of the Rantanen (2013) dataset. See E-mail from
Ryan Holte & Ted Sichelman, Professor of L., Univ. of San Diego Sch. of L., to Jason Rantanen, Professor of
L., Univ. of Iowa Coll. of L. (Feb. 4, 2021) (on file with corresponding author).
86. The kappa coefficient is measured by the following formula:
where 𝑝! is the overall proportion of observed agreement and 𝑝" is the overall proportion of agreement expected
by chance. Jacob Cohen, A Coefficient of Agreement for Nominal Scales, 20 EDUC. & PSYCH. MEASUREMENT 37,
39–40 (1960).
87. Id. at 41–42.
88. See id. at 39–43. There are many kappa alternatives available, but scholars created the alternative
formulas to accommodate multiple raters and/or ordinal data, which are unnecessary for our data.
89. J. Richard Landis & Gary G. Koch, The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical Data,
33 BIOMETRICS 159 (1977).
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based method.90 Landis and Koch qualify their agreement categories as “Poor,”
“Slight,” “Fair,” “Moderate,” “Substantial,” and “Almost Perfect” depending on
the magnitude of kappa.91 Additional data on the kappa analysis is provided in
Appendix A.
2. Decisions Included in the Studies
Comparison of the records in the two datasets revealed 125 records that
were found in both datasets, 28 that were found only in Holte and Sichelman
(2019), and 54 that were found only in Rantanen (2013).92 Of the 28 records
found only in Holte and Sichelman (2019), 15 were pre-decision and 13 were
post-decision. Of the 54 records found only in Rantanen (2013), 15 were predecision and 39 were post-decision. In fact, even though the numbers of records
from the pre-cert period were about the same, the actual overlap for that period
was only 49 out of 79 records. And the difference for the post-cert period was
even more than the summary statistics in Part I.B suggested: only 76 records
were in both studies out of 128 records.
TABLE 6: COMPARISON OF DECISIONS INCLUDED IN EACH DATASET
Case Included in
Holte & Sichelman (2019)

Case Included in Rantanen
(2013)
No
Yes
Total

No
Yes
Total

0
28
28

54
125
179

54
153
207

This is a remarkably poor match! Despite both sets of coders being highly
sophisticated in patent law, and using the same criteria, the two sets of coders
concluded they should include a given Federal Circuit decision in the dataset
only 60% of the time; yet based on chance alone we would expect that the coders
would agree 67% of time. While there are an unknown number of decisions that
90. Daniel Klein, Implementing a General Framework for Assessing Interrater Agreement in Stata,
18 STATA J. 871, 879–80 (2018); KILEM L. GWET, HANDBOOK OF INTER-RATER RELIABILITY: THE DEFINITIVE
GUIDE TO MEASURING THE EXTENT OF AGREEMENT AMONG RATERS (4th ed. 2014).
91. To interpret the kappa values, we use the following benchmark guidelines: 0.0–0.20: slight; 0.21–0.40:
fair; 0.41–0.60: moderate; 0.61–0.80: substantial; and 0.81–1: almost perfect. Note that because we use Gwet’s
probabilistic-based method, a given kappa value does not directly translate into a benchmark range. We report
the benchmark agreement. Additional details are in Appendix A.
92. As noted in Part I.C., there were a few decisions that were contained in both studies, but which were
coded by one set of authors or the other in a way that did not meet our inclusion criteria. For example, even if a
decision appeared in Holte & Sichelman (2019) and was coded as having a final determination, if that decision
was coded as “No Final Determination” in Rantanen (2013), it was not considered to be part of the Rantanen
(2013) dataset that we used for the comparison. See supra note 72. In total, there were four decisions from
Rantanen (2013) that were dropped from the Rantanen (2013) dataset used in this comparison for this reason
and four decisions from Holte & Sichelman (2019) that were dropped from the Holte & Sichelman (2019) dataset
used in this comparison.
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both studies did not include (“No-No’s”), the lack of agreement on marginal
cases is surprising—particularly when viewed in relation to the number of
decisions that both studies included (“Yes-Yes’s”). And this is just the threshold
determination of whether the decision involved a final § 103 analysis.
To further examine the differences, one of us93 blind-coded94 the eightytwo records found in only one of the two datasets.95 The results are below. The
bottom line is that most of the cases found in only one of the two datasets
probably should have been included in both studies.
TABLE 7: ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS INCLUDED IN ONLY ONE DATASET
Dataset

Holte & Sichelman
(2019) only
Rantanen (2013)
only
Total

Determination of Whether Decision Involved § 103
Definitely

Not
Sure

Definitely
Not

Rule 36

Total

13

4

5

7

28

29

3

1

21

54

42

7

6

28

82

This observation, coupled with further review of the opinions, suggests that
most of the difference appears to be due to type II errors, false negatives. Both
studies missed opinions that should probably have been included but did not
include many opinions that probably should not have been included.96
93. Kriz blind-coded the records.
94. By “blind-coded” we mean that Rantanen provided Kriz with a set of case names and citations,
organized chronologically, with instructions to apply a three-point scale: (1) Decision clearly contains an
obviousness determination, (2) it is a judgment call as to whether decision contains an obviousness
determination, or (3) decision clearly does not contain an obviousness determination. The specific criteria was
that:
An obviousness determination is defined as whether or not the Federal Circuit addressed the
obviousness of a utility patent in the context of a validity determination. As a result, obviousness
determinations involving design patents were excluded, as were obviousness determinations for the
purpose of determining whether there was an interference-in-fact in the context of an interference
proceeding. Obviousness-type double-patenting analyses were also excluded.
Decisions from each study were interspersed and there was no indication of which decision was from
which study. It was preferable that Kriz did this as Rantanen may have been biased due to having conducted the
prior study.
95. The Rule 36 decisions were not included in this analysis.
96. In response to our observation, the authors of Holte & Sichelman (2019) provided additional detail on
their decision selection methodology beyond what was described in Holte & Sichelman (2019). E-mail from Ted
Sichelman, Professor of L., Univ. of San Diego Sch. of L., to Jason Rantanen, Professor of L., Univ. of Iowa
Coll. of L. (Jan. 29, 2021) (on file with author) [hereinafter Jan. 2021 E-mail from Ted Sichelman to Jason
Rantanen]. Specifically, they noted that because Holte & Sichelman (2019) focuses on judicial reasoning, they
excluded district court opinions resting solely on jury determinations unless they could locate the JMOL order
on Westlaw. Because they significantly relied on district court cases to identify associated Federal Circuit
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In addition, we examined the characteristics of the decisions that were only
in one dataset or the other. The following tables summarize the characteristics
of records that were only in Rantanen (2013) or Holte and Sichelman (2019) for
the pre- and post-KSR time period.
TABLE 8: VARIABLE COMPARISONS OF DECISIONS IN ONLY ONE DATASET
Procedural Posture
Jury
Bench
JMOL
SJ
Total

Holte & Sichelman
(2019) only
7
9
5
7
28

Dataset
Rantanen
(2013) only
27
14
1
12
54

Total
34
23
6
19
82

Holte & Sichelman
(2019) only

Dataset
Rantanen
(2013) only

Obvious

14

19

33

Nonobvious
Both
Total

13
1
28

35
0
54

48
1
82

Holte & Sichelman
(2019) only

Dataset
Rantanen
(2013) only

Obvious

12

18

30

Nonobvious
Mixed
Total

16
0
28

34
2
54

50
2
82

Posture Outcome

CAFC Result

Total

Total

appeals, this methodology effectively reduced the number of appeals that they identified that arose from jury
verdicts in the context of a denial of a renewed motion for JMOL. In addition, they indicated that they “focused
their coding on Federal Circuit decisions with some reasoning, either in the district court opinion, or in the
Federal Circuit opinion itself,” and that the consequence of this was to not include Federal Circuit opinions that
merely affirmed a jury determination with no reasoning. Id. Judge Holte and Professor Sichelman indicated that
17 of the decisions that were in Rantanen (2013) but not in Holte & Sichelman (2019) were reviewed in an
earlier round of case coding but they decided not to include them in the final dataset for this reason. Id. Because
these decisions were not contained in the dataset for Cycles of Obviousness, however, we did not include them
in our analysis here. Nor have we (the authors of this paper) tested whether there is a significant difference in
the amount of judicial reasoning in the opinions that were included versus those that were not, and so we cannot
say one way or another whether this is distinction is reflected in the data.
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Dataset
Disposition

Holte & Sichelman
(2019) only

Rantanen
(2013) only

Total

Affirmed
Reversed
Mixed
Total

21
7
0
28

50
2
2
54

71
9
2
82

This comparison suggests that the differences in which cases were included
in the two studies affected some of the results the studies reported. Particularly,
for outcomes at the district court: while two thirds of the decisions that were
only in Rantanen (2013) involved a district court outcome of nonobvious, only
about half of the decisions that were only in Holte and Sichelman (2019) did. In
addition, half of the decisions that were only in Rantanen (2013) arose from
denials of JMOLs, whereas only 25% of the decisions that were only in Holte
and Sichelman (2019) did. The differences for the other two fields (outcomes at
the Federal Circuit and affirmances) were present, but not as substantial.
The bottom line is that despite using what appears to be the same inclusion
criteria based on the methodological descriptions within the articles and the
codebooks, the two research teams made different decisions about case
inclusion. At the composite level, out of the 207 decisions in the comparison set
that were contained in one or both studies, only 125 were in both studies; with
at least another 41 that probably should have been included. In addition, these
differences affected results: the cases that were only in Rantanen (2013) were
characterized by more appeals from denials of JMOLs and fewer outcomes of
“obvious” both in the cases being reviewed and in the Federal Circuit’s opinions.
Before exploring likely reasons for this difference, however, we also wanted to
examine whether there were differences in how the two teams coded information
at an individual record level for those that both included in their datasets.
E. INDIVIDUAL RECORD COMPARISON
Besides examining the characteristics of decisions that were contained in
only one of the two datasets, we also looked at how the sets of authors coded
decisions once they were in the dataset. This section compares the coding for the
125 decisions that met the comparison set requirements. As with including cases,
they used the same written criteria for both studies.97 Overall, agreement
between the two studies was high, with some notable exceptions.

97. See RANTANEN CODEBOOK, supra note 51; Holte & Sichelman Codebook, supra note 51.
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1. Procedural Posture
Overall, there was high agreement in the coding for these cases. The kappa
coefficient is 0.72 (standard error of 0.05) and is statistically significant at the
0.05 level. This suggests that there is substantial agreement between Holte and
Sichelman (2019) and Rantanen (2013) on the procedural posture variable.98
TABLE 7: COMPARISON OF PROCEDURAL POSTURES FOR
DECISIONS IN BOTH DATASETS
Holte & Sichelman (2019)
Procedural Posture

Jury
Bench
JMOL
SJ
Multiple Postures
Total

Rantanen (2013)
Procedural Posture
Jury

Bench

JMOL

SJ

26
1
13
1
2
43

1
31
0
1
0
33

1
0
8
0
1
10

2
3
0
34
0
39

Multiple
Postures
0
0
0
0
0
0

Total
30
35
21
36
3
125

The biggest area where the Rantanen (2013) data differed from that of
Holte and Sichelman (2019) is in classifying a case as a jury trial versus a JMOL.
Of the fifteen disagreements on “JMOL,” for example, fourteen were because
Rantanen (2013) classified the decision as arising from a jury verdict, while
Holte and Sichelman (2019) classified it as arising from a JMOL. This difference
appears to be a result of different coding methodologies: while Rantanen (2013)
consistently coded denial of a JMOL as “Jury,”99 Holte and Sichelman (2019)
sometimes recorded denials of a JMOL in their dataset of Federal Circuit
decisions as “Jury” and sometimes as “JMOL.”100 As noted above, this is an area
where coding instructions may result in more consistent coding.
2. Coding of Obviousness Outcomes
There was high agreement on the coding of the district court determinations
being reviewed by the Federal Circuit, with 111 agreements out of 125 records.
The kappa coefficient is 0.79 (standard error 0.05), representing substantial
agreement.

98. The percentage agreement between the datasets for the Procedural Posture field was 79%.
99. See RANTANEN CODEBOOK, supra note 51.
100. Jan. 2021 E-mail from Ted Sichelman to Jason Rantanen, supra note 96.
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TABLE 8: COMPARISON OF DISTRICT COURT OUTCOMES FOR
DECISIONS IN BOTH DATASETS
Holte & Sichelman (2019)
Lower Court Result
Obvious
Nonobvious
Both
Total

Obvious
57
2
5
64

Rantanen (2013)
Lower Court Result
Nonobvious
Both
4
2
54
0
1
0
59
2

Total
63
56
6
125

There was also very high agreement on coding of the outcomes at the
Federal Circuit; there were 114 agreements on § 103 and 11 disagreements.101
Overall agreement was 91%.102 The Cohen’s kappa coefficient was 0.82
(standard error 0.05), representing almost perfect inter-rater reliability.103
TABLE 9: COMPARISON OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT OUTCOMES FOR
DECISIONS IN BOTH DATASETS
Holte & Sichelman (2019)
Federal Circuit Result
Obvious
Obvious
Nonobvious
Mixed Outcomes
Total

73
3
0
76

Rantanen (2013)
Federal Circuit Result
Mixed
Nonobvious
Outcomes
3
41
0
44

4
1
0
5

Total
80
45
0
125

101. In addition, there were three decisions that Rantanen (2013) coded as being “No Final Decision” and
Holte & Sichelman (2019) coded as reaching a final result on obviousness.
102. Taking into account the three cases that Rantanen (2013) coded as being “No Final Decision.”
103. Standard error of 0.05 is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Overall agreement was 91%. For
comparison, Rantanen (2013) reported a Cohen’s kappa for the CAFC_Result category of 0.96. Rantanen,
Obviousness Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 766.
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3. Coding of Appellate Disposition
TABLE 12: COMPARISON OF APPELLATE DISPOSITIONS FOR
DECISIONS IN BOTH DATASETS
Holte & Sichelman (2019)
Federal Circuit
Disposition

Affirmed
Reversed
Mixed Dispositions
Total

Rantanen (2013)
Federal Circuit Disposition
Affirmed

Reversed

100
0
0
100

1
19
1
21

Mixed
Dispositions
2
1
0
3

Total
103
20
1
124

As Table 12 shows, there was significant agreement on the coding of
appellate disposition. Cohen’s kappa agrees, producing a coefficient of 0.87
(standard error 0.05)—almost perfect agreement.104
F. CODING OF JUDICIAL REASONING
One important component of both studies is the examination of the court’s
actual reasoning. Both studies looked at the language of the court’s opinions
relating to their § 103 analysis, examining some core hypotheses in the literature.
In particular, the two studies examined the changes in which the Federal Circuit
opinions (1) used some recognizable form of the teaching-suggestionmotivation (“TSM”) test, (2) used the “formal” version of the TSM tests, and (3)
invoked the concept of “common sense.”105 Both studies found that there had
been a decline in the Federal Circuit’s use of the TSM test post-KSR, particularly
in the court’s use of a formal version of the test, and an increase in the court’s
invocation of “common sense.”106 Neither study considered Rule 36 summary
affirmances in this analysis.107
Comparing the coding for the set of opinions included in both studies
revealed mixed results. For this analysis, entries coded as “Blank” are treated as
the absence of one of these elements of judicial reasoning. Inter-rater reliability
was highest for whether the court applied common sense; the kappa was 0.80
(standard error 0.10), representing substantial agreement.

104. The percentage agreement between the two datasets was 96%. One record was not coded for appellate
disposition in Rantanen and was not included in the analysis.
105. For additional details on these categories, see Rantanen Obviousness Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at
752–57.
106. See Rantanen, Obviousness Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 759–60; see also Holte & Sichelman, supra
note 8, at 129–30.
107. See Rantanen, Obviousness Jurisprudence, supra note 8; see also Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8, at
155.
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The other two methods of judicial reasoning, however, did not fare as well.
The kappa coefficient for the “Formal” version of the TSM test was 0.67
(standard error 0.09), representing substantial agreement. Inter-rater reliability
agreement for whether there was some use of the TSM test was even lower. The
kappa coefficient was 0.38 (standard error 0.09) indicating only fair agreement,
two steps below the substantial category on the benchmark scale.
TABLE 10: COMPARISON OF ANALYSIS CODING FOR DECISIONS
CONTAINED IN BOTH DATASETS
Holte & Sichelman (2019)
Court Used Common Sense
Yes
No
Total

Yes
9
1
10

Rantanen (2013)
Court Used Common Sense
No
3
97
100

Total
12
98
110

Yes
15
8
23

Rantanen (2013)
TSM Formal
No
3
84
87

Total
18
92
110

Yes
33
18
51

Rantanen (2013)
Some Use of TSM
No
16
43
59

Total
49
61
110

Holte & Sichelman (2019)
TSM Formal
Yes
No
Total
Holte & Sichelman (2019)
Some Use of TSM
Yes
No
Total

This makes sense: both the “Formal” version of the TSM test and the use
of “common sense” are relatively objective determinations based on the
presence of certain language in the opinion, whereas whether there was some
use of the TSM test would naturally be more subjective. For this reason, when
referencing data from these studies, it may be better to rely on the more
objective—and replicable—metrics.
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G. REPLICATION OF REGRESSIONS
Besides comparing the coding for the two studies, we also replicated two
of the regressions from Table 2 of the Appendix to Holte and Sichelman
(2019).108 These regressions supported Holte and Sichelman’s conclusion that
KSR shifted its outcomes substantially (if not as much as the district courts).109
Using the same technique as Holte and Sichelman (2019), we applied a
probit model using Holte and Sichelman (2019)’s original dataset,110 the dataset
from Rantanen (2013), and the decisions that were only present in both datasets.
In all three cases, our results were consistent with those of Holte and Sichelman
(2019): there was a significant increase in outcomes of “obvious” after the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in KSR, regardless of which dataset we used.
The complete results of these regressions are in Appendix C.
H. REASONS FOR THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DATASETS
By far the biggest issue when comparing these studies was the
disagreement on which cases to include in each study. This difference highlights
the importance of carefully documenting and describing the method for record
selection in empirical legal studies and providing information on which data
points scholars include in the study.111 Including a mechanism to allow for
comparison with other studies can also be beneficial for future cross-study
comparisons. For example, for studies involving the Federal Circuit, researchers
may want to consider using the uniqueID identifier provided in the Compendium
of Federal Circuit Decisions.112
While both studies had documented case inclusion criteria, one possibility
is that those criteria may have been unclear or not detailed enough. That most of
the inclusion errors were false negatives indicates the coders did not
misunderstand the instructions completely but interpreted the inclusion criteria
instructions conservatively. For the Rantanen (2013) study, coders were
instructed that an “obviousness determination was defined as whether or not the
Federal Circuit addressed the obviousness of a utility patent in the context of a
validity determination.”113 Coders for Holte and Sichelman (2019) were more
simply instructed to determine “if the CAFC actually holds the patent obvious”
(or nonobvious).114 Given the simplicity of both instructions, it is reasonable to
believe coders were erring on the side of caution when deciding and would have
been less likely to indicate a decision involved nonobviousness unless it was
explicitly clear.
108. See Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 169.
109. Id. at 154–55.
110. We dropped the two cases that were from the Court of Federal Claims rather than the Federal Circuit.
111. Rantanen, Response to Holte & Sichelman, supra note 60.
112. Jason Rantanen, The Landscape of Modern Patent Appeals, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 985, 1001 (2018)
[hereinafter Rantanen, Modern Patent Appeals].
113. Id.
114. Holte & Sichelman Codebook, supra note 51, at 11.
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For example, when determining whether to include decisions where the
Federal Circuit was reviewing a summary judgment or JMOL, coders may have
strictly adhered to the inclusion criteria. Because judges are analyzing summary
judgments and JMOLs in the context of whether the accused infringer met the
evidentiary burden, coders may not have considered the opinions to be
addressing obviousness in the validity or holding the patent to be obvious or
nonobvious. Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc. v. NuVasive, Inc.115 illustrates this point.
That opinion involved an appeal from a denial of a JMOL on obviousness among
other issues. The opinion is succinct in addressing obviousness, with a single
paragraph concluding that the district court did not err without an in-depth
analysis of the issue.116
Indeterminacy is another explanation. It may be that for the question of
whether to include a given Federal Circuit decision, there are some decisions
that are simply difficult or impossible to categorize into the buckets of
“obviousness determination” or “no obviousness determination.” Consider, for
example, Flex-Rest, LLC v. Steelcase, Inc.,117 a decision that Holte and
Sichelman (2019) included but Rantanen (2013) did not. That case involved an
appeal of a jury verdict finding the patent in suit invalid for anticipation and
obviousness.118 The patent owner’s challenge on appeal was to the district
court’s ruling to exclude testimony by its expert on the issues of anticipation and
obviousness, a decision that the Federal Circuit affirmed.119 While this decision
relates to obviousness, it does not directly decide the issue. Instead, it is
collateral. Opinions like these are difficult to classify and even extremely clear
coding instructions may not be adequate.
Yet, it is also important to recognize that despite the disagreements in
which cases were included and which were not, the reported results were
directionally consistent and the coding for most aspects of the court’s decisions
agreed between the two studies. There were only two notable exceptions:
classification of a decision as arising from a jury verdict or JMOL and coding of
the TSM_Use judicial reasoning field.
The differences in Jury vs. JMOLs in the two datasets raise two important
questions for appellate decision analysis studies. One is the question of when an
appellate decision involving a jury should be included at all; the second is the
difficulty for coders of differentiating between an appeal involving a “jury
verdict” and an appeal involving “JMOL”—particularly because, procedurally,

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc. v. NuVasive, Inc., 778 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1370.
Flex-Rest, LLC v. Steelcase, Inc., 455 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1356. The patent owner did not move for JMOL or a new trial.
Id. at 1360.
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in order to appeal a “jury verdict,” it’s almost always necessary to seek a
JMOL.120
On the first question, an appeal from a jury verdict involves a more
complex procedural framework than a review of a bench trial: it incorporates
both the jury’s verdict and (almost always) a judge’s decision on a renewed
motion for JMOL.121 Thus, if the goal is to focus on judicial decision-making,
then analyzing only appeals from bench trials makes sense. On the other hand,
juries play a very important part in the adjudication of disputes involving
obviousness, so excluding them entirely means excluding a substantial portion
of decisions.
A related concern involves how the appellate dataset is assembled. If the
dataset of appellate decisions is being assembled based primarily on district
court decisions, and denials of JMOLs are routinely not published, then the
identification of appellate decisions will be systematically biased against
including appeals from denials of JMOLs. This is a plausible explanation here.
It also raises the broader concern that researchers must recognize that some types
of orders may not be as available as other orders simply because courts do not
publish them.
The second issue—how to code an appeal involving a “jury verdict” versus
an appeal involving “JMOL”—is more directly addressed. This is an area where
it would be beneficial to have clearly developed objective criteria.122 When a
decision is an appeal from the grant of a JMOL, we should code it one way
(Rantanen (2013) coded this as “JMOL”).123 When a decision is an appeal from
denial of a JMOL—in other words, the jury’s decision stands—we should code
it a different way (Rantanen (2013) coded this as “Jury”). Being able to
differentiate in this way may be especially important when analyzing how an
appellate court treats district court decisions that grant versus deny JMOLs, an
issue that can be important when assessing appellate deference to juries.
A third issue arises specifically in studies of § 103. Nonobviousness
determinations are questions of law based on underlying findings of fact.124
However, sometimes in jury trials the judge will effectively give the entire
120. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 71, § 5.07.
121. A renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law will be granted where the jury verdict lacks
substantial evidence. ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2537 (3d ed., 2020). On appeal, questions
of law, including summary judgments and JMOLs are reviewed de novo on appeal, so no deference is given to
the district court’s decision. DAVID G. KNIBB, FED. CT. APP. MANUAL § 31.3 (6th ed., 2020). Jury verdicts are
reviewed under the rational basis standard, meaning that the court of appeals will set aside the jury verdict if
there is no rational basis for the jury’s conclusion. Id. § 31.5. In other words, the court of appeals may reverse
the jury verdict if no reasonable and impartial fact finder could have reached the same conclusion as the verdict.
Id. When there are mixed findings of law and fact, the applicable standard of review is determined by assessing
the questions at issue and whether the questions are primarily factual or legal. Id. § 31.6. However, courts also
tend to divide rulings to handle each distinct question separately under the appropriate standard of review, but
this strategy only works to the extent rulings can be divided into respective parts. Id.
122. RANTANEN CODEBOOK, supra note 51.
123. See id. (providing this standard under “Procedural Posture”).
124. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
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question to the jury (subject to a JMOL),125 while in others the judge will have
the jury render an “advisory” verdict. 126 Yet in others, the jury will make
findings of fact while the judge will make the ultimate determination of
nonobviousness.127 These distinct possibilities complicate differentiations
between whether a jury decided the procedural posture of the underlying
nonobviousness determination or was instead a grant of JMOL. While typically
we think of a JMOL as the district judge rejecting the jury’s verdict as a matter
of law, for nonobviousness disputes a jury might, for example, render an
advisory verdict of nonobviousness that the judge agrees with. Is that a jury
decision or JMOL? This may lead to indeterminacy as to procedural posture.
The final notable area of disagreement was the identification of the judicial
reasoning used in the opinions. Given that the coders most often disagreed on
whether the courts used some recognizable form of the TSM test but were
relatively consistent when identifying when an opinion was using reasoning
falling at each end of the spectrum, it is likely that identification of TSM is more
indeterminate than identifying its specific linguistic manifestations. However,
when judges stray from formal, established language, even students with
significant patent law experience and law professors may find it difficult to agree
on the theory behind this more fluid judicial reasoning. So, when there is no
formal “test” being clearly articulated in an opinion, it is reasonable to expect
variability in coding outcomes. This level of disagreement between the two
studies on this aspect of the courts’ opinions suggests it is especially important
to develop explicit instructions and for studies to report a measure of inter-rater
agreement metric for these variables. At the very least, it is important to identify
which coded variables are more subjective than others and attempt to account
for that subjectivity.
II. THE NEXT SEVEN YEARS
Besides comparing the data used in Rantanen (2013) and Holte and
Sichelman (2019), we extended the existing Rantanen (2013) dataset to the
present. This updated dataset contains all Federal Circuit decisions in appeals
arising from the district courts that involved a § 103 validity decision for a utility
patent.128

125. See Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc., 321 F.3d 1098, 1104–05 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
126. See Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
127. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(noting that where mixed questions of law and fact are concerned, it is permissible to allow the jury to make any
underlying factual determinations while leaving the ultimate legal conclusion to the judge).
128. As with Rantanen (2013) and Holte & Sichelman (2019), design patents were not included in this
analysis. In addition, interferences and other appeals from the USPTO were not included.

April 2022

STUDYING NONOBVIOUSNESS

697

A. METHODOLOGY
To assemble the complete dataset, we first updated the § 103 data from
1996 to April 30, 2012 to reflect everything that we learned from the analysis in
Part I. This revised dataset includes all decisions that were in Rantanen (2013)
and those from Holte and Sichelman (2019) that were not in Rantanen (2013)
and which, after review, we determined met the study criteria. We also reviewed
records that were in Rantanen (2013) and coded as “Not sure whether involved
a § 103 issue” or “Definitely did not involve a § 103 issue” in Part I to determine
whether we should retain them.129
In addition, in order to simplify and remain consistent with the analysis in
Part I, we changed the unit of analysis to the “decision” level rather than the
“analysis” level. As for the analysis conducted in Part I, cases with multiple
consistent outcomes from Rantanen (2013) were coded under that outcome. For
example, if all analyses were coded as “obvious,” we coded the outcome for the
case as “obvious.” Cases with different outcomes (for example “obvious” and
“nonobvious”) were coded as “mixed.” There were relatively few of these
decisions.130 The final dataset for the period from June 26, 1996, to April 30,
2012, contains 377 decisions.131
To update the dataset with decisions from May 1, 2012, to the end of 2019,
we followed a process similar to that in Rantanen (2013), but with the benefits
of hindsight and the Compendium of Federal Circuit Decisions. Because the
Compendium contains text-searchable copies of all documents published on the
Federal Circuit’s website,132 rather than drawing on a word search conducted in
Westlaw, we were able to directly search the text of all Federal Circuit written
opinions between 2012 and 2019 for opinions containing the string “obvious*”
and “nonobvious*” in appeals arising from the district courts.133 As in Rantanen
(2013), one of the study’s authors reviewed these opinions to determine whether
they might “plausibly involve an obviousness issue,” a coarse filter. Three
research assistants with substantial experience coding Federal Circuit decisions
then reviewed the resulting 273 opinions to determine whether each involved a
§ 103 issue based on the study selection criteria.134 All three coders agreed on
the yes/no determination for 218 out of the 273 (80% agreement). The kappa
coefficient is 0.76 (standard error 0.03), indicating substantial agreement among
129. Each of the records from Holte & Sichelman (2019) that were added were independently coded by two
research assistants—in other words, while we used Holte & Sichelman (2019) to ensure the completeness of the
dataset, we did not copy the substantive coding from Holte & Sichelman (2019).
130. For example, 12 decisions from 1996 to 2012 had a “mixed” outcome at the Federal Circuit on the
issue of whether the court concluded the claims on appeal were obvious.
131. As in Rantanen (2013) and Holte & Sichelman (2019), we did not include appeals involving
interferences or preliminary injunctions in the analysis. However, these are included with the dataset.
132. Rantanen, Modern Patent Appeals, supra note 112, at 987–88.
133. For a description of the Compendium of Federal Circuit Decisions, see id. at 988.
134. The coders followed the same procedures used in the 2013 decisions but with some additions for
improved clarity. See Rantanen CODEBOOK, supra note 51. A copy of the revised coding instructions is available
in the project data archive. Rantanen, et al., Replication Data, supra note 22.
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all three coders.135 The remaining opinions were reviewed by both Rantanen and
Kriz, in consultation, to make a final determination of whether they met the
study criteria.
For Rule 36 summary affirmances, two research assistants reviewed the
appellant’s brief (and if necessary, the appellee’s brief) for all Rule 36 summary
affirmances arising from the district courts between 2012 and 2019 to determine
whether a decision on obviousness was necessary to the court’s affirmance. The
coders agreed on 591 out of 598 yes/no determinations. Of the seven
disagreements, six involved decisions for which one coder could not locate the
briefs and thus did not make a determination. One of the study authors reviewed
the seven decisions on which the coders did not agree to make the final
determination of whether to include the decision in the study.
The complete dataset for 2012–2019 consisted of 154 written opinions and
76 summary affirmances. Two research assistants coded information about the
procedural posture, outcome at the district court, outcome at the Federal Circuit,
and Federal Circuit disposition. Initial agreement for these fields ranged from
84%–93%. We instructed the research assistants to review their coding for the
decisions that contained at least one disagreement; after review, agreement
ranged from 90%–94% depending on the field.136 One of the study’s authors
reviewed the remaining disagreements to make the final determination.
Inter-rater reliability statistics for all measures show substantial agreement
between the two coders. For the initial determination of the procedural posture
variable, the kappa coefficient for inter-rater agreement is 0.75 (standard error
0.03). When coding the outcome of the district court, the kappa statistic is 0.85
(standard error 0.03). Agreement was also high for the outcome of the Federal
Circuit; the kappa coefficient is 0.79 (standard error 0.03). Finally, there was
also substantial agreement in coding the Federal Circuit disposition variable.
The kappa statistic is 0.84 (standard error 0.04). Using probabilistic benchmark
scale,137 the two coders had substantial agreement on all variables.
Agreement between coders increased for three of the measures after coders
reviewed decisions containing at least one disagreement. Following this review,
the kappa coefficient for procedural posture is 0.86 (standard error 0.03). For
Federal Circuit disposition variable, the kappa statistic is 0.91 (standard error
0.02). For the district court outcome variable, the kappa statistic is 0.89 (standard
error 0.03). The kappa coefficient for Federal Circuit result is 0.84 (standard

135. Since there are three raters, we cannot use Cohen’s kappa. To calculate this kappa statistic, we use the
Fleiss kappa. The Fleiss kappa extends the Cohen’s kappa to three or more raters. See Joseph L. Fleiss,
Measuring Nominal Scale Agreement Among Many Raters, 76 PSYCH. BULL. 378, 378–79 (1971).
136. Coders were told that a decision contained a disagreement, but not which variable(s) there was
disagreement on.
137. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (describing Landis and Koch’s benchmark scale).
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error 0.04). Appendix B contains cross-tabulation for both rounds of coding and
kappa calculations.
We then merged this 2012–2019 dataset with the data from 1997–2012,
with duplicate decisions from the overlapping period dropped, to create the final
dataset. For the analysis below, we excluded appeals arising from the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (“USPTO)” (such as in an appeal from a denial of a patent
application), interferences, and appeals from the grant or denial of a preliminary
injunction because the primary focus of the analysis was on appeals in patent
infringement cases.
Finally, while our focus was not on appeals from the USPTO, peer
commentators suggested that we need to include data on appeals from the
USPTO as a reference point. To provide this comparison, we drew on data from
the Compendium of Federal Circuit Decisions to obtain numbers of decisions
coded in the Compendium as involving a § 103 issue. In order to independently
assess the reliability of this data, we compared the Issue_103 coding from the
Compendium to the opinions identified in the 1997–2019 dataset.138 Table 14
summarizes the 96% agreement between the two ways of capturing whether an
opinion involved a § 103 issue.
TABLE 11: COMPARISON DATA ON § 103 CODING
Fed. Cir. Appeals
involving § 103 issue
No
Yes
Total

Compendium of Federal Circuit Decisions
No

Yes

Total

1722
61
1783

19
262
281

1741
323
2064

Based on this comparison, we concluded that the Issue 103 coding from
the Compendium provided a reasonable measure of the number of Federal
Circuit decisions involving a § 103 issue for opinions. This provided
comparative data for appeals arising from the USPTO.
A reminder about selection effects: In reading the data below, it is
important to keep in mind selection effects and population biases.139 The data
described below comprises Federal Circuit decisions involving appeals of § 103
issues that arose from the district courts. This context means that it is subject to
multiple selective pressures: First, there must have been an infringement case
filed, there must be a final decision involving a § 103 issue at the district court,

138. This comparison involving matching the decisions in the 1997–2019 dataset with the records in the
Compendium. Because the Compendium only contains Federal Circuit decisions starting in 2004, in practice this
comparison only reflects decisions from the period 2004–2019.
139. Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 26, at 2070–71; Lunney, E-Obviousness, supra note 26, at 374;
Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 11, at 434–35.
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the losing party must have appealed, the parties must not have settled the dispute
(which sometimes happens even after appeal), and the losing party must have
addressed the § 103 issue in its briefs.140 In addition, the number of decisions in
a year is not large, so caution is warranted in reading-in conclusions based on a
single year or two.141 This is true even though the goal of this project was to
collect population-level data: that is, all Federal Circuit decisions involving
§ 103 that arose from the district courts.
B. SECTION 103 FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS OVER TIME
For appeals arising from the district courts, the average number of
decisions on an annual basis involving § 103 was the same for the post-2019
period as compared to the five-year period immediately after KSR. We found
140 opinions and 66 Rule 36 affirmances involving a § 103 issue between May
1, 2012 and December 31, 2019 (an average of 27 decisions/year), as compared
with 106 opinions and 27 Rule 36 affirmances in the five years described in the
2013 study (an average of 27 decisions/year). However, closer inspection reveals
some striking trends.
First, the number of decisions involving § 103 has not remained constant.
Figure 1 shows the number of Federal Circuit decisions involving § 103 in
appeals arising from the district courts between 1997 and 2019, broken up by
the number of opinions and Rule 36 summary affirmances.

140. For a variety of reasons, parties may elect not to appeal issues on which they lose in a lower tribunal.
For example, a patent owner may have had two patents invalidated at the district court but for strategic reasons
chosen to appeal on only one of those patents. Or an accused infringer may have lost on both infringement and
invalidity but decided to only challenge the infringement issue due to its perception of the strength of that issue.
141. For previous discussions of population biases and selection effects, see Rantanen, Judicial Opinions,
supra note 9.
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FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS INVOLVING § 103 IN APPEALS
ARISING FROM DISTRICT COURTS, 1997–2019

While the average number of decisions between 2007 and 2012 was the
same as the average annual number of decisions between 2012 and 2019, a
general upward slope characterizes the period from 2007 to 2013 and a general
downward slope from 2013 to 2019. The number of Federal Circuit decisions
involving § 103 issues appealed from district court decisions peaked around
2013, with over thirty decisions a year between 2012 and 2014, followed by
noticeably fewer decisions in recent years.142 In addition, heightened use of Rule
36 summary affirmances relative to written opinions characterize the period
from 2012 to 2016. The court was using the summary affirmance mechanism for
§ 103 determinations arising from the district court more frequently during this
time period. During this period, the Federal Circuit’s use of Rule 36 summary
affirmances in appeals arising from the district courts has remained relatively
constant.143
In contrast, the number of decisions involving § 103 that arose from the
USPTO increased dramatically over this time period. Table 15 shows the relative

142. This pattern is consistent even when the total number of decisions in appeals arising from the district
courts on any issue is taken into consideration. See Lunney, E-Obviousness, supra note 26 for an explanation of
why this can matter. To make this comparison, we compared the data from Figure 1 with the total numbers of
opinions and Rule 36 affirmances each year from the Compendium. As with the absolute numbers, the relative
frequency of Rule 36 decisions involving nonobviousness to all Rule 36 decisions was much higher for the years
2009–2013 than for 2014–2019.
143. See Jason Rantanen, Federal Circuit Statistics – 2020 Edition, PATENTLYO (Jan. 4, 2021),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2021/01/federal-circuit-statistics.html (drawing on data from the Compendium to
show the relative frequency of Rule 36 summary affirmances and written opinions).
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number of opinions (these do not include Rule 36 summary affirmances)
involving a § 103 issue as coded in the Compendium of Federal Circuit
Decisions for appeals arising from the district courts and USPTO.
TABLE 12: FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS IN APPEALS ARISING FROM THE
DISTRICT COURTS AND USPTO THAT INVOLVED § 103.
Origin of Case
Year

District Court

USPTO

Total

2004
2005

3
16

2
5

5
21

2006
2007
2008
2009

21
18
23
29

3
4
6
13

24
22
29
42

2010
2011

24
21

10
15

34
36

2012
2013
2014

27
24
20

17
18
18

44
42
38

2015
2016

24
15

30
56

54
71

2017
2018

24
16

69
69

93
85

2019

18

68

86

Total

323

403

726

C. OBVIOUSNESS OUTCOMES
Another perspective on nonobviousness decisions at the Federal Circuit is
to examine them in terms of final determinations.144 Between 2012 and 2019,
final outcomes on § 103 at the Federal Circuit in appeals from district court
determinations were almost a fifty-fifty split: ninety-seven decisions in which
the court reached a final determination of “nonobvious” and ninety-three in

144. Final determinations of nonobviousness reflect only decisions in which the court made a final
determination; for example, they do not include outcomes of “no final determination.” In addition, for purposes
of this analysis we have not included the small number of “mixed” decisions. See, e.g., Rantanen, Obviousness
Jurisprudence, supra note 8; Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8.
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which it reached a final determination of “obvious.”145 However, as Figure 2
shows, most of the “obvious” decisions were from the period 2012–2015, while
the last few years have seen relatively more outcomes of “nonobvious.” Even as
the number of Federal Circuit decisions in appeals arising from the district courts
has fallen, so too has the frequency of outcomes of “obvious.”
FIGURE 1: OBVIOUS VS. NONOBVIOUS OUTCOMES AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT,
1997–2019

Figure 3 presents a twenty-five-record rolling average graph. This is a
moving average of the percentage of times in which the Federal Circuit has
reached a conclusion of “obvious” in a final determination in a moving set of
twenty-five decisions, beginning with decisions 1–25, then the average for 2–
26, etc.146

145. This analysis is limited to only appeals in which the Federal Circuit reached a final determination on
the issue of obviousness. It does not include 16 decisions for which the outcome was coded as “No Final
Determination.” It also does not include the small number (6) of outcomes coded as “Mixed.”
146. Keep in mind that even though years are provided on the X-axis for reference, a moving average shows
an average of the record units and thus is not consistent over time. For example, there were more § 103 decisions
in 2014 than in 2019. Thus, this chart does not reflect the lower number of § 103 decisions in appeals arising
from the district courts in recent years. In addition, the last 25 averages contain successively fewer observations,
so there is a potential for data artifacts at the end of the graph.
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FIGURE 2: 25-RECORD TRAILING AVERAGE OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT
OBVIOUSNESS DECISIONS, 1996–2019

D. PROCEDURAL POSTURE AND OUTCOMES
Until recently, appeals from summary judgment made up a substantial
portion of Federal Circuit decisions involving § 103. However, over the past few
years the number of decisions involving appeals from summary judgment has
declined sharply. Most disputes involving § 103 that have resulted in a Federal
Circuit decision have been appeals from full trials on the merits, not summary
judgment. These are patents for which there is a real question of the merits of
the § 103 issue.
Figure 4 shows the relative proportions of procedural postures for each
year. When reading Figure 4, keep in mind that the number of decisions varies
for each year.
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FIGURE 3: PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF § 103 DECISIONS IN APPEALS
ARISING FROM DISTRICT COURTS, 1997–2019

As shown below, more often than not, in recent years these factfinders have
concluded that the patents in suit are not obvious.
FIGURE 4: DISTRICT COURT OUTCOMES REVIEWED AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Figure 5 shows that while many of the district court decisions the Federal
Circuit reviewed during the years following KSR were findings of “obvious,” in
recent years the Federal Circuit has reviewed fewer district court outcomes of
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“obvious” even as the number of outcomes of “nonobvious” has remained about
the same.147
E. APPELLATE DISPOSITIONS
We also observe that the affirmance rate for district court decisions
involving § 103 continues to be high—higher even than pre-KSR.148 Figure 6
reports data on complete affirmances as a function of total Federal Circuit
decisions—that is, the denominator includes affirmances, reversals, vacates, and
the rare “mixed” disposition in which the district court is affirmed on at least
one § 103 decision and reversed on another. Only “affirmances” are counted in
the numerator.
FIGURE 5: PERCENTAGE OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING § 103 THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AFFIRMED

Not only have affirmances been high in recent years, but they involve a
shift from the period immediately following KSR in what is being affirmed.
Table 16 compares three time periods: Federal Circuit dispositions between

147. See Appendix A.
148. Nonobviousness rates are not unique in having a high affirmance rate. See Mark A. Lemley &
Samantha Zyontz, Does Alice Target Patent Trolls?, 18 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 47, 76 (2021) (finding an
affirmance rate of around 90% in appeals involving patent eligible subject matter).
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January 1, 1997 and June 26, 2006;149 between April 30, 2007 and April 30,
2012;150 and since May 1, 2012.
TABLE 13: AFFIRMANCE RATES FOR DISTRICT COURT DETERMINATIONS OF
OBVIOUS AND NONOBVIOUS

Obvious
Nonobvious

1/1/1997–
6/26/2006
56%
71%

4/30/2007–
4/30/2012
82%
65%

5/1/2012–
12/31/2019
78%
83%

Surprisingly, while the period prior to April 30, 2012, is consistent with
Table 4 in Rantanen (2013),151 reflecting an increase in Federal Circuit
affirmances of district court determinations of “obvious” following KSR, since
2012 there has been a substantial rise in affirmances of district court
determinations of “nonobvious.” Indeed, since 2015, the affirmance rate for
these determinations has been even higher: 89% of all district court
determinations of “nonobvious” since January 1, 2015, have been affirmed.152
Even as the court has been reviewing a higher proportion of district court
determinations of “nonobvious,” it has been affirming those determinations at a
higher rate. This presents a contrast with the immediate aftermath of KSR when
only district court outcomes of obvious were being affirmed at a much higher
rate.
F. ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS INVOLVING § 103
What might be some explanations for these shifts—particularly the decline
in the frequency of appellate decisions involving § 103, the increased affirmance
rate, and the high frequency of disputed patents being held nonobvious?
One possibility is that litigating parties adapted to the new standard of
KSR.153 While the disputes for the first few years after KSR may have reflected
lawsuits (and appeals) filed before KSR, more recent disputes may reflect
decisions made in the new normal—the world in which the higher threshold
applies. Those cases would thus be closer to the indeterminate boundary between
obvious and nonobvious (as opposed to being on the “obvious” side of the postKSR standard).154 As parties settle the more determinate cases, the consequence
149. The date on which certiorari was granted in KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 548 U.S. 902 (2006).
150. For example, from the date the Court issued its opinion in KSR until the end of Rantanen (2013), five
years after the Court’s opinion.
151. See Rantanen, Obviousness Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 744 tbl.4. Note that several of the decisions
from Holte & Sichelman (2019) that were added to the Rantanen (2013) dataset were Rule 36 summary
affirmances, thus increasing the overall affirmance rate slightly.
152. This constitutes 57 out of 64 decisions. For reference, the affirmance rate for district court
determinations of obvious has been 83% (38/46) since 2015.
153. See, e.g., Lunney & Johnson, supra note 8, at 76–79.
154. See Rantanen, Obviousness Jurisprudence, supra note 8, at 764.
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would be a return to what Glynn Lunney refers to as “the underlying
equilibrium,” which Lunney calculates at around a 30% patent owner win
rate.155
There are a few reasons to be skeptical of this explanation, however. The
settlement theory on which we base this explanation is a theory of disputes, not
issues.156 Unless a § 103 question is essentially the sole issue involved in a
litigated dispute, there are other considerations that will affect which disputes
parties settle and which they litigate. The consequence is that equilibrium-based
strategic settlement selection theories such as Priest-Klein do not provide a
theory for selection for outcomes on individual issues.157 Another reason to be
skeptical that the changes in § 103 decisions are due to an equilibrium-based
selection theory is that the decline in the number of decisions involving § 103
and increase in the nonobvious rate began around eight years after the Court’s
decision in KSR. It was also sudden and dramatic. Even accounting for the fact
that disputes can take time to percolate up to a Federal Circuit decision, that is a
long time for the shift to manifest. Selection theories such as Priest-Klein assume
that most disputes are settled, thus resulting in substantial selection for those
disputes that are litigated. However, the data in Holte and Sichelman (2019)
indicates that most substantive obviousness determinations at the district courts
are appealed to the Federal Circuit, limiting the effect that selection at the
appellate level could have.158
Another explanation is that these trends reflect changes in the substance
and process of patent law itself. Three major events have dominated patent law
over the last ten years: Congress’s passage of the America Invents Act in 2011,
which changed substantive elements of patent law; the creation and rise of inter
partes review proceedings (“IPRs”) at the USPTO; and the emergence of patent
eligible subject as an explicit limit on patentability.159 Of these, we think the
latter two had the greatest potential to affect appellate decisions involving § 103.
There are several reasons IPRs may lead to fewer § 103 appeals from the
district courts. IPRs are significantly faster than district court litigation. Once

155. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution,
11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 10, 14 (2003) [hereinafter Lunney, A Quiet Revolution].
156. See Lunney & Johnson, supra note 8, at 76–78; Jason Rantanen, Why Priest-Klein Cannot Apply to
Individual Issues in Patent Cases 2 (Univ. of Iowa Coll. of L. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 12-15,
2013).
157. See Rantanen, supra note 156, at 3–7 (discussing the application of the Priest-Klein selection effect
theory to multi-issue appeals).
158. See Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 136 (reporting 319 district court opinions and 192 Federal
Circuit opinions that had actual obviousness determinations between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2013).
There is certainly still selection at the district court level. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L.
Schwartz, Our Divided Patent System, 82 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1080 (2015). However, here the
hypothesized selection is from the district court to the appellate court rather than selection from all possible
disputes.
159. See DUFFY & MERGES, supra note 23.
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the USPTO grants a petition for IPR, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board must
issue a final determination within, at most, eighteen months.160 A resolution in
this time period is very expeditious as compared to the many years patent
litigation disputes last in district courts.161 It can also mean that the dispute may
end with a decision that a patent is invalid well before it reaches a final judgment
at the district court.162 In addition, any district court action filed on or after the
petition date challenging the validity of a claim of the patent is automatically
stayed for the pendency of the IPR.163 District courts also have inherent power
to control their dockets and therefore can, and often do, stay district court
proceeding in favor of subsequently filed IPRs.164
Further, a petition for IPR will not be granted unless the petitioner has
shown a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one of the challenged
claims, which may indicate the possibility of a favorable outcome.165 Once the
petition is granted, the petitioner is only required to prove invalidity by a
preponderance of the evidence, as opposed to the clear and convincing evidence
standard in district courts.166 A substantial number of § 103 disputes that could
happen in the district courts may simply be resolved in IPRs,167 and with fewer
district court rulings on nonobviousness, there are fewer appeals to the Federal
Circuit involving the same.
Another explanation for the changes we observe in nonobviousness
decisions at the Federal Circuit is the tightening of subject eligibility following
four major Supreme Court decisions between 2010 and 2014.168 For many years,
courts loosely interpreted patent eligible subject matter under § 101169 to
encompass nearly anything that was a “process, machine, manufacture, or

160. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (2018); Christian Helmers & Brian Love, The Effect of New Information on
Patent Litigation: Evidence from U.S. Inter Partes Review 7 (June 29, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3720709; Brian J. Love, Shawn P. Miller & Shawn Ambwani, Determinants of Patent
Quality: Evidence from Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 90 UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 67, 103–04 (2019).
161. Helmers & Love, supra note 160, at 8 (showing that, on average, it takes three to four years after a
complaint is filed for an appellate decision to issue).
162. Love et al., supra note 160, at 101 n.151 (“According to LexMachina.com, the median time to summary
judgment in patent cases filed since 2000 is about 660 days.”).
163. 35 U.S.C. § 315 (2018); Helmers & Love, supra note 160, at 3.
164. See Jonathan Stroud, Linda Thayer & Jeffrey C. Totten, Stay Awhile: The Evolving Law of District
Court Stays in Light of Inter Partes Review, Post-Grant Review, and Covered Business Method Post-Grant
Review, 11 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 226, 237–38 (2015).
165. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); Helmers & Love, supra note 160, at 6; Love et al., supra note 160, at 98–99.
166. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); Love et al., supra note 160, at 103.
167. Love et al., supra note 160, at 96 (finding that almost 6,500 petitions for IPR have been filed since
September 2012, which exceeds the total number of patent cases filed in all district courts except the Eastern
District of Texas during the same time).
168. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589–90 (2013); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609 (2010); Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71–72 (2012).
169. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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composition of matter.”170 Critics at the time also believed patents being issued
during this time were not only directed to ineligible subject matter but also
invalid as obvious.171 But under the strict application of the TSM test prior to
KSR, invalidating patents as obvious was quite difficult.172 So for many years,
patents that should have otherwise been invalid were easily satisfying the
relaxed § 101 standard, and litigants often failed to meet the burden for
invalidation under § 103 with the strict application of the TSM test.
The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in KSR gave the courts—particularly
the district courts—increased ability to rely on the obviousness requirement to
resolve disputes.173 The decision also brought attention to the nonobviousness
requirement, invigorating accused infringers to raise this ground of invalidity.174
This led, initially at least, to a surge in decisions involving nonobviousness.175
That decision, however, was followed by Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,
Mayo Collaborative Services. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc, and Bilski v.
Kappos176 which offered accused infringers an alternative—and sometimes even
more potent—way to challenge patents that may have had some of the same
underlying issues that could give rise to obviousness problems.177 Indeed, since
the shift to using the Alice/Mayo framework to assess patentability, courts have
found patents were directed to ineligible subjects in a majority of cases involving
§ 101.178 The strict application of Alice/Mayo allows courts to quickly dispose
of patents that are clearly invalid, even if doing so reaches into the territory of
questions that are better addressed under § 103.179 But courts are inclined to
decide cases under § 101 because patent eligibility is purely a question of law
that can be addressed on a motion to dismiss or judgment on the pleadings—as
compared to § 103, which at the earliest can be dismissed at the summary
judgment stage.180 Therefore, what we are observing may be, as some scholars

170. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. 619, 649 (2018); Dennis
Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making,
25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673, 1677 (2010).
171. See Gugliuzza, supra note 170, at 650.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 651; Crouch & Merges, supra note 170, at 1685–86 (suggesting that obviousness should be
considered prior to alternate grounds for invalidity).
174. Rantanen, supra note 8, at 739 (2013); Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 139–40.
175. Holte & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 141.
176. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
177. See Gugliuzza, supra note 170, at 652.
178. See Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Nothing?, 71 VAND.
L. REV. 765, 774 (2018).
179. See id. at 777; see also Gugliuzza, supra note 170, at 655.
180. See Gugliuzza, supra note 170, at 651; see also Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 178, at 777–78; Paul
Gugliuzza, The Procedure of Patent Eligibility, 97 TEX. L. REV. 571, 614–616 (2019).
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have suggested, patent eligibility serving as a rough filter for other questions of
patentability—particularly § 103.181
A final explanation for what we observe draws on the first en banc decision
by the Federal Circuit since 1994182 to address § 103: the court’s Apple v.
Samsung opinion in 2016.183 At the district court, the jury found the ‘721 and
‘172 patents were nonobvious and accordingly denied Samsung’s requests for a
JMOL on the issue.184 Samsung appealed both JMOL denials, which the Federal
Circuit affirmed in an 8-3 decision.185 Because obviousness is a question of law
based on underlying findings of fact, the Federal Circuit’s analysis focused on
whether the jury had sufficient evidence to support their findings of
nonobviousness.186 The jury’s findings, and the Federal Circuit’s analysis,
regarding the ‘721 patent is interesting in this respect.
At trial, Samsung presented evidence of two prior art references that
together taught every element of the disputed claim, yet the jury still found the
claim was nonobvious.187 In reviewing the evidence, the Federal Circuit focused
not only on the Graham188 factors but also put a significant emphasis on the
secondary considerations of nonobviousness.189 In particular, Apple presented
large amounts of evidence on the industry praise, copying, commercial success,
and long-felt unresolved need.190 The outcome here could suggest that the
Federal Circuit is reluctant to overcome jury findings, but also could be evidence
of where the judges on the Federal Circuit stand on obviousness.
Another possibility is that Apple served as a signal for the judges’
normative views on § 103. The decision itself was 8-3 in favor of
nonobviousness (Judge Moore authoring the majority opinion), with Chief
Judge Prost and Judges Reyna and Dyk all dissenting.191 Looking at the period
from 2013 to 2019, those three judges had the second, third, and fourth-highest
ratio of obvious to nonobvious outcomes when authoring the majority

181. See Gugliuzza, supra note 170, at 655.
182. That opinion was In Re Donaldson Co. Inc., 16 F.3d 1189, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also
In re Dillon., 919 F.2d 688, 198 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc). Thanks to David Taylor and the dataset maintained
by the Federal Circuit Blog for data on Federal Circuit en banc decisions. En Banc Cases, FEDCIRCUITBLOG,
https://fedcircuitblog.com/en-banc/cases (last visited Mar. 18, 2022).
183. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc).
184. Id. at 1038.
185. Id. at 1038–39.
186. See id. at 1047.
187. Id. at 1050–52.
188. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). (“Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art
are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims are to be ascertained; and the level of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the
subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved
needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the
subject matter sought to be patented.”).
189. Apple, 839 F.3d at 1052–53.
190. See id. at 1053–57
191. See id. at 1034.
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opinion.192 Only Judge Lourie has a higher rate (47% of the opinions that Judge
Lourie authored had an outcome that the patents are obvious). All the other
judges in the majority had ratios between 0–25% for majority-authored opinions.
Apple may be less notable for legal pronouncements about obviousness law than
what it says about the Federal Circuit judges’ normative schema on
obviousness.193
To be clear, we are not suggesting that the Federal Circuit judges are closeminded on the issue of obviousness, nor that they have pre-decided the issue in
a case. Every active judge has authored at least one opinion in which the outcome
was that the patent was obvious and one in which the outcome was that the patent
was not obvious (with one exception who has only authored three opinions
involving the issue).194 Overall ratios of obviousness to nonobviousness
decisions may still be instructive as a proxy for a judge’s general attitudes
regarding § 103.
CONCLUSION
The data suggest we are in a new “cycle of obviousness,” to use Holte and
Sichelman’s term, one in which the outcome of most appeals from district court
decisions is the patents-in-suit are nonobvious. We are also in a period of greater
affirmance of district court decisions on obviousness. However, this shift may
also result from the use of IPRs and invalidity challenges based on § 101 that
effectively weed out patents that are also unlikely to survive a nonobviousness
analysis in a district court proceeding.
The return to a new normal in which the Federal Circuit rejects § 103
challenges in district court appeals is consistent with long-term historical studies
of the Federal Circuit that have found it holds in favor of the validity of patents.
As Glynn Lunney, Jr. and others have observed, the Federal Circuit era has been
one in which the court has been reluctant to invalidate patents, especially on
§ 103 grounds.195 While KSR had an effect at the district courts, and to some
extent on the Federal Circuit, that effect has since faded, and now other factors
overshadow it.
This does not mean that patent owners win at the Federal Circuit: that is a
different issue from whether patents are invalid based on § 103. As Lunney and

192. Chief Judge Prost: 8 out 18 (44%); Judge Reyna: 3 out of 7 (43%); Judge Dyk: 3 out of 8 (38%). For
additional details, see Appendix D.
193. Melissa F. Wasserman & Jonathan D. Slack, Is Too Much Specialization a Bad Thing? Specialization
in Specialized Courts, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 1405, 1419 (“[O]pinion specialization on specialized courts increases
the chances that doctrine may reflect idiosyncratic preferences of a few judges.”).
194. See Appendix D.
195. See Lunney, A Quiet Revolution, supra note 155, at 15, 26; Lunney, E-Obviousness, supra note 26, at
374–75; Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Impact on Patent
Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 112 (2006).
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others have observed, often the Federal Circuit concludes a patent is valid but
not infringed.196
If the new normal is primarily being driven by IPR proceedings and the rise
of § 101-based challenges, it may not be as meaningful of a return to pre-KSR
trends as it might appear. Since a sizeable portion of IPR proceedings involves
challenges based on § 103, a decline in appeals from district courts that involve
§ 103 does not say all that much about the relative importance of the doctrine.197
A detailed examination of appeals from IPRs, however, is for another article.
More broadly, as the analysis in Part I demonstrates, there can be a high
level of consistency between independent coders of the same judicial opinions.
This finding helps to validate macro-level studies of judicial opinions. However,
our analysis reveals the importance of decisions about whether to include
individual judicial decisions within the study population. This suggests that
scholars should give greater attention to this stage of studies of judicial opinions.
Well-developed and documented instructions to guide decisionmakers in the
inclusion determination should be a primary focus for all researchers.

196. See Lunney, A Quiet Revolution, supra note 155, at 14.
197. Love et al., supra note 160, at 96 (finding that almost 6,500 petitions for IPR have been filed since
September 2012, which exceeds the total number of patent cases filed in all district courts except the Eastern
District of Texas during the same time period).
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A1: HOLTE AND SICHELMAN AND RANTANEN
DATASET INTER-RATER RELIABILITY
Kappa
Coefficient

Standard
Error

Probabilistic
Benchmark Interval

Procedural Posture

0.72

0.05

0.60 – 0.80

Lower Court Result

0.79

0.04

0.60 – 0.80

Federal Circuit Result

0.82

0.05

0.60 – 0.80

Federal Circuit Disposition

0.87

0.05

0.60 – 0.80

Some Use of TSM

0.38

0.09

0.20 – 0.40

TSM Formal

0.67

0.09

0.40 – 0.60

Common Sense

0.80

0.10

0.60 – 0.80

Variable
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APPENDIX B
TABLE B1: PRE-REVIEW INTER-RATER RELIABILITY
Kappa
Coefficient

Standard
Error

Probabilistic
Benchmark Interval

Procedural Posture

0.75

0.03

0.60 – 0.80

Lower Court Result

0.85

0.03

0.60 – 0.80

Federal Circuit Result

0.79

0.03

0.60 – 0.80

Federal Circuit Disposition

0.84

0.04

0.60 – 0.80

Variable

TABLE B2: PRE-REVIEW PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Coder 1
Procedural Posture
Jury
47
1
3
0
0
1
52

Jury
Bench
SJ
PI
PTO
Other
Total

Bench
8
85
2
0
0
3
98

Coder 2
Procedural Posture
JMOL
SJ
PI
7
2
0
0
0
0
7
48
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
2
3
14
52
10

PTO
0
1
1
0
3
0
5

Total
64
87
61
7
3
9
231

TABLE B3: PRE-REVIEW LOWER COURT RESULT
Coder 1
Lower Court Result

Coder 2
Lower Court Result
Obvious

Nonobvious

Both

No Final
Determination

Total

104

3

0

2

109

Nonobvious

3

106

0

3

112

Both

2

0

1

3

6

2

1

0

1

4

111

110

1

9

231

Obvious

No Final Determination
Total
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TABLE B4: PRE-REVIEW FEDERAL CIRCUIT RESULT
Coder 1
Federal Circuit Result
Obvious
Obvious
Nonobvious
Both
No Final Determination
Total

96
4
3
0
103

Coder 2
Federal Circuit Result
No Final
Nonobvious Both
Determination
4
0
2
85
0
8
1
1
4
4
0
19
94
1
33

Total
102
97
9
23
231

TABLE B5: PRE-REVIEW FEDERAL CIRCUIT DISPOSITION
Coder 1
Federal Circuit Disposition
Affirmed
Affirmed
Reversed
Vacated
Mixed
Total

Coder 2
Federal Circuit Disposition
Reversed
Vacated
Mixed

176
1
0
0
177

0
25
0
1
26

0
1
11
1
13

7
1
2
5
15

Total
183
28
13
7
231

TABLE B6: POST-REVIEW INTER-RATER RELIABILITY
Kappa
Coefficient

Standard
Error

Probabilistic
Benchmark Interval

Procedural Posture

0.86

0.03

0.80 – 1.00

Lower Court Result

0.89

0.03

0.80 – 1.00

Federal Circuit Result

0.91

0.02

0.80 – 1.00

Federal Circuit Disposition

0.84

0.04

0.60 – 0.80

Variable
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TABLE B7: POST-REVIEW PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Coder 1
Procedural Posture
Jury

Bench

56
0
3
0
0
0
1
60

2
87
1
1
0
0
3
94

Jury
Bench
JMOL
SJ
PI
PTO
Other
Total

Coder 2
Procedural Posture
JMOL SJ PI PTO
6
0
7
0
0
0
0
13

0
0
0
49
0
0
0
49

0
0
0
0
6
0
4
10

Other

Total

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

64
88
11
51
6
3
9
232

0
1
0
1
0
3
0
5

TABLE B8: POST-REVIEW LOWER COURT RESULT
Coder 1
Lower Court Result
Obvious
Obvious
Nonobvious
Both
No Final
Determination
Total

109
1
2
4
116

Coder 2
Lower Court Result
No Final
Nonobvious Both
Determination
2
0
0
105
0
0
0
3
0
4
1
1
111

4

1

Total
111
106
5
10
232

TABLE B9: POST-REVIEW FEDERAL CIRCUIT RESULT
Coder 1
Federal Circuit Result
Obvious
Obvious
Nonobvious
Both
No Final Determination
Total

99
1
2
2
104

Coder 2
Federal Circuit Result
No Final
Nonobvious Both
Determination
1
94
1
4
100

0
0
5
1
6

1
0
0
21
22

Total
101
95
8
28
232
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TABLE B10: POST-REVIEW FEDERAL CIRCUIT DISPOSITION
Coder 1
Federal Circuit Disposition
Affirmed
Reversed
Vacated
Mixed
Total

Coder 2
Federal Circuit Disposition
Affirmed Reversed Vacated Mixed
179
2
0
3
184

0
21
0
2
23

0
3
11
0
14

1
1
2
7
11

Total
180
27
13
12
232

April 2022

STUDYING NONOBVIOUSNESS

719

APPENDIX C
TABLE C1: PROBIT ESTIMATES OF THE LIKELIHOOD THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
FINDS OBVIOUSNESS POST-KSR GRANT OF CERT
Original Data
Holte &
Sichelman
Rantane (2013)
(2019)
Post-KSR Cert
No. of Observations

Comparison Data
Holte &
Sichelman
Rantanen (2013)
(2019)

0.22***

0.13**

0.29***

0.31***

(0.08)

(0.06)

(0.10)

(0.10)

190

290

125

120

Log-likelihood

-125.15
-198.01
-77.27
-74.13
Marginal effects reported with discrete change of indicator variables from 0 to 1.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

TABLE C2: PROBIT ESTIMATES OF THE LIKELIHOOD THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
FINDS OBVIOUSNESS POST-KSR GRANT OF CERT
Original Data
Holte &
Sichelman Rantanen (2013)
(2019)
Post-KSR Cert
Bench
Jury
JMOL
SJ
No. of Observations
Log-likelihood

Comparison Data
Holte &
Sichelman Rantanen (2013)
(2019)

0.19**

0.12*

0.25**

0.31***

(0.08)

(0.06)

(0.10)

(0.11)

0.10

-0.19

-0.04

-0.38*

(0.19)

(0.13)

(0.13)

(0.20)

-0.03

-0.21

-0.12

-0.39**

(0.19)

(0.13)

(0.14)

(0.19)

0.06

0.10

(0.18)

(0.16)

0.38***

0.22*

0.33***

0.04

(0.14)

(0.12)

(0.10)

(0.21)

190

288

125

120

-114.4

-178.83

-68.59

-65.16

Marginal effects reported with discrete change of indicator variables from 0 to 1.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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TABLE C3: PROBIT ESTIMATES OF THE LIKELIHOOD THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
FINDS OBVIOUSNESS POST-KSR GRANT OF CERT
Original Data
Holte &
Sichelman Rantanen (2013)
(2019)
Post-KSR Cert
No. of Observations
Log-likelihood

Comparison Data
Holte &
Sichelman Rantanen (2013)
(2019)

0.22***

0.13**

0.29***

0.31***

(0.08)

(0.06)

(0.10)

(0.10)

190

290

-125.15

-198.01

125
-77.27

120
-74.13

Marginal effects reported with discrete change of indicator variables from 0 to 1.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

TABLE C4.
Original Data
Holte &
Sichelman Rantanen (2013)
(2019)
Post-KSR Cert
Bench
Jury
JMOL
SJ

Comparison Data
Holte &
Sichelman Rantanen (2013)
(2019)

0.19**

0.12*

0.25**

0.31***

(0.08)

(0.06)

(0.10)

(0.11)

0.10

-0.19

-0.04

-0.38*

(0.19)

(0.13)

(0.13)

(0.20)

-0.03

-0.21

-0.12

-0.39**

(0.19)

(0.13)

(0.14)

(0.19)

0.06

0.10

(0.18)

(0.16)

0.38***

0.22*

0.33***

0.04

(0.14)

(0.12)

(0.10)

(0.21)

No. of Observations

190

288

125

120

Log-likelihood

-114.4

-178.83

-68.59

-65.16

Marginal effects reported with discrete change of indicator variables from 0 to 1.
*

p<0.10,

**

p<0.05,

***

p<0.01
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APPENDIX D
TABLE D1: OBVIOUSNESS DECISIONS BY AUTHORING JUDGE, 2013–2019
CAFC Result
Judicial Opinion
Author
Chen
Dyk
Hughes
Lourie
Moore
Newman
O'Malley
Prost
Reyna
Stoll
Taranto
Wallach
Total

Obvious

Nonobvious

Mixed

No Final
Determination

Total

2
3
1
8
2
1
0
8
3
2
3
1
34

4
5
3
7
6
3
2
7
3
5
6
2
53

1
0
0
2
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
4

2
0
0
0
1
0
1
2
1
1
0
1
9

9
8
4
17
9
4
3
18
7
8
9
4
100
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